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Chapter Three
The Kempei Police System and 
Regional Control
In the first decade of colonial rule following Japan’s annexation of Korea, the governing 
style had such a pronounced military character that it has come to be called “military 
rule” (budan seiji). The “military” bent of the government was shaped, first, by the fact 
that the governor general was, by Japanese law, a top-ranking military officer with wide 
discretionary powers, and, second, by the adoption of the kempei-dominated police 
system (kempei police system) to support the execution of colonial rule. 
As described in Chapter One, Korea’s kempei police system was formally established 
in June 1910 as the outcome of an historical rivalry and power struggle between the Korean 
police (civil police force) and the kempeitai (gendarmerie) in Korea. The resolution of 
their struggle resulted in the “merger” of the two into one structure, but because the top 
positions in the police organization were staffed by kempei officers, the relationship of 
kempei (or military police) and police in the unified structure was never simply one of 
coexistence. The Central Police Headquarters chief (Keimu sōchō) was concurrently an 
army general and commander-in-chief of the Korea kempeitai, and the Provincial Police 
Department (Keimubu) chiefs also, were kempeitai field officers heading the provincial 
kempeitai. Because these officers served simultaneously in kempeitai and high-level 
police positions, the kempeitai had a firm grip on the backbone of power over the civil 
police. (See Figure 6)
Further, kempei personnel were authorized to carry out ordinary police work, 
and kempeitai detachment stations and outstations, in addition to police stations and 
substations where civil police were detailed, functioned as police agencies. As a general 
rule, civil police were posted around the newly-opened ports and around railway centers, 
while kempei were deployed in other areas that the military police designated as high 
security or important in the campaign to wipe out the Righteous Armies, but the domain 
where kempei were empowered to function as ordinary police was actually far bigger 
than the total area under the jurisdiction of the civil police. (See Figure 7) 
With kempei officers in command of its central axis, the kempei police system had 
an extremely strong military coloration, both in the structure of its internal organization 
and in the way it was used to govern the Korean people. That is probably why the 
administration of Korea in the 1910s is sometimes described not as “military rule,” but 
more bluntly as “kempeitai rule.” The kempei police system also stood as evidence of how 
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greatly the Korea kempeitai at that time differed from the Japanese parent organization. 
The kempeitai in Korea was a special kind of gendarmerie with more and stronger powers 
than Japan’s own. A core distinction was its organizational hierarchy; while the kempeitai 
in Japan proper and in other Japanese-occupied territories was under the commander-
in-chief of the kempeitai organization in Japan, the work of the military police in Korea 
came under the direction of Japan’s minister of war and minister of the navy, and ordinary 
police work was directed by the governor general in Korea. (See Figure 6)1 In fact, 
according to personnel rules for army officers established as policy in October 1910, in 
the areas of rank and pay, the “commander-in-chief of the ‘Korea kempeitai’ …. is to be 
Figure 6. Kempei Police Organization (Outline)
Source: Based on charts in Shisei nijūgo-nen shi [A Twenty-five Year History of the Administration of Korea], edited 
and published by the Government General of Korea, 1935, p. 33.
Notes 
1. This chart shows the organization immediately after Imperial Ordinance No. 343 of the “Regulations on the 
Kempeitai in Korea” was issued on 10 September 1910. 
2. The thick lines indicate the chain of command of civil police and the thin lines the chain of command of the 
military police. The double lines (=) indicates concurrently held posts. 
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treated as equivalent to …. the commander-in-chief of the kempeitai [in Japan],” which 
placed the two on an equal level.2 
Partly because it was unique among all the other kempeitai organizations in Japan 
and its occupied territories, the kempei police system operating in Korea during this 
phase of Japan’s colonial rule has stimulated a number of studies focusing on the system 
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and Police], sent from Kempei Commander Akashi Motojirō to War Minister 
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Figure 7. Respective Areas of Jurisdiction of the Kempei and Civil 
Police (as of March 1914)
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itself, and there is a comparatively large number of works in the broader field of policing 
in colonial Korea that deal with this unique organization.3 They tend, however, to leave 
many topics unexamined, mainly because the ban on certain kinds of publications and 
public expression during the period of “military rule” ensured that very few relevant 
materials would be available to study today. In this chapter I want to take up three of the 
topics that have received little or no attention.
First, how should we understand the kempei police system as an institution? It 
derived its distinctive character from the role in it of the kempei: whereas originally they 
were meant to perform as gendarmes or military police, in the kempei police system they 
were assigned to civil police positions and they were also authorized to do ordinary police 
work. Yet most of the published research on the kempeitai police system does not examine 
the laws and statutes pertaining to the appointments to police posts and to police work 
carried out by gendarmes. Studies in this area, consequently, contain multiple factual 
misunderstandings. I will try to rectify some of those misunderstandings by presenting 
evidence that the laws and rules governing the appointment of kempei officers to police 
posts on the one hand, and those authorizing kempei to do ordinary police work on the 
other, were completely separate from the start, and that the policy objectives in each set 
of laws and regulations were also different. 
Second, I examine what the Government General thought about the state of Korea’s 
security—how it perceived the conditions for peace, order, and stability. Once it was 
established, just before annexation, the kempei police system went virtually unchanged 
right up until the March 1st Movement of 1919. Except for a short time at the very 
beginning, it underwent no significant organizational expansion. That is why previous 
studies give only summary accounts of the Government General’s outlook and consider 
that it, too, did not change much. I argue that we cannot assume that there was no change 
at all in the way the Government General regarded the peace and security situation during 
the decade of the kempei police system. In this chapter we will trace certain shifts in the 
views of the Government General and the people who were in charge of security and 
public order. The two major junctures when those shifts occurred were the incident known 
as the “Case of the 105,” which is discussed later, and the outbreak of the first world war. 
The third topic of this chapter is an examination of how, in practical terms, the smallest 
units of colonial government were administered under the kempei police system. Some 
studies on this period make a point of detailing the brutality in the methods used by the 
kempei police to assert their control, and they constitute a valuable body of work. But they 
rely mainly on such sources as ordinances, regulations, and instructions, and also on the 
biography of Akashi Motojirō, who was the commander-in-chief of the Korea kempeitai. 
There have been almost no attempts to explore what the actual work of administration in 
the local regions consisted of or how the officers saw it, using primary sources coming 
out of the Korea kempeitai itself. During my search for source materials, I was fortunate 
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to come across a large volume entitled Chōsen chūsatsu kempeitai shiryō [Documents 
of the Korea Kempeitai] (held by Tama Branch of Hōsei University Library), which 
contains material on conferences relating to kempei police activities in the area around 
Kangwŏndo during the first half of the 1910s. This was a major find, and it allowed me 
to get a fairly broad picture of the nature and diversity of activities by the low-level 
kempei police. I wanted to investigate not only activities that would have been required 
of the higher (political) police but I also looked closely at the wide-ranging involvement 
of kempei police personnel in routine administrative police duties, a development that is 
considered to be peculiar to the 1910s. 
1. Institutional Aspects of the Kempei Police System
In the kempei police system, kempei, who were all military men, assumed civil police 
positions and also took on ordinary police duties, creating an exceptional organization. In 
the view of one admiring historian, “Such a strong policing system exists nowhere else 
in the world.”4 Be that as it may, the institutional and legal aspects of the kempei police 
remain underexamined. In this section we will look at its institutional core by considering, 
first, the practice of appointing kempei to police positions and, second, having kempei 
officers take on ordinary police work. Section 3 of the first chapter noted how certain 
ideas had been germinating for some time in the mind of Akashi Motojirō, the leading 
actor in the kempei police system. He wanted gendarmes to be ranked above civil police, 
and he envisioned using the gendarmerie as the nucleus of the manpower needed for 
regional control. This section shows how those ideas were incorporated into the kempei 
police system and the ways in which they were reflected in its operations. 
The insufficient understanding of the institutional aspects of the kempei police 
system shows up clearly, among other places, in two conflicting views that continue to 
appear today concerning a basic question: What proportion of the manpower in the Korea 
kempeitai dealt with ordinary police work? One view assumes simply that everyone 
did—that all kempeitai personnel in Korea were involved in some way with ordinary 
police work. Most of the earlier studies make that interpretation an unspoken premise. 
A more thorough discussion on this appears later, but to summarize: Even general 
accounts sometimes point out that there was a large-scale increase in kempeitai numbers 
during 1910–1911. This view could not have been developed without assuming that 
statistics given for “gendarmes… who carry out the duties of police stations” (emphasis 
added) that appear in the Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō [Annual Statistical Report of the 
Government General of Korea] of 1910 and 1911 are simply figures that represented all 
kempei personnel.
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The other view holds that, “In areas where there were no police stations, kempei 
detachment stations and outstations performed police duties in their stead. Responding to 
necessity, therefore, commissioned officers and lower ranking officers in the kempeitai 
were given concurrent appointments as police superintendents and police inspectors.”5 
If we stand by that approach, it means that “in the 1910s, not everyone in the Korea 
kempeitai was automatically assigned to concurrent ordinary police duties …. just a 
portion of them were given such assignments” (emphasis added).6 
The two views are too different to be easily reconciled, and, in any case, it turns out 
that both ways of reading the issue are mistaken. Against the claim of the first, we must 
look at the figures for all “Korea kempeitai personnel” and compare them with the figures 
for “Korean kempeitai personnel engaged in ordinary police work.” Doing that, we can 
clearly see that not all the Korea kempeitai personnel acted as ordinary police. As for the 
second view, the writers have conflated the two procedures—“assigning kempei officers 
to civil police positions” (superintendent, police inspector, etc.) and “engaging kempei 
in ordinary police duties”—and taken them to be the same thing. In fact, the laws and 
regulations governing each one were issued separately, and we must also consider the 
possibility that the policy goals embedded in each were different. 
With those points in mind, we can set out the main tasks of this section, the first of 
which is to separate the two activities, under the kempei police system, of “assigning 
kempei officers to civil police positions” and “engaging kempei in ordinary police 
duties.” Once we do that, we can look again at the respective laws and regulations with a 
view to better understanding the circumstances of the police position assignments as well 
as what, exactly, ordinary police work entailed. Finally, we will investigate the policy 
intentions behind those laws and regulations and the ultimate aims of the police work 
done by kempeitai personnel. 
Regarding civil police postings, a topic that has not been well understood, an 
important point is that as a whole, the majority of kempei were not assigned to police 
positions, particularly at the beginning of the 1910s. Data in Shokuin-roku [Personnel 
Directory] issued by the Cabinet Printing Bureau makes this clear. Each annual edition 
of the Directory, in the subsection “General Headquarters of the Kempeitai Garrison in 
Korea” under the “Ministry of War” section, lists the names of all kempeitai personnel 
in Korea with rank of noncommissioned officer or above, while the subsection “Police 
Stations” coming under the section “Government General of Korea” lists all civil police 
personnel from the rank of police inspector and higher. The names of kempei officers 
assigned to positions in the civil police are included in this section. By studying both lists, 
it is possible to identify those in the Korea kempeitai headquarters who were assigned 
to positions in the civil police, which came under the Government General of Korea. 
The above Directory does not list superior privates with ranks below noncommissioned 
officer, but considering that there was no law providing for the assignment of superior 
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privates to civil police positions,7 we can identify kempeitai officers who were assigned 
to police positions by referring to the data in the Directory. Figure 8 shows the results of 
surveys done on kempeitai assignments to police posts throughout the era of “military 
rule.” 
By studying the table, we can see a correlation between the kempei officers’ ranks 
and their assignment rate. That is to say, in each year for which data are given, almost 
100 percent of the upper-ranking commissioned officers and warrant officers had police 
positions, but that was not the case with the lower ranks; on the whole, for kempei 
sergeant-majors, sergeants, and corporals, the lower the rank, the smaller the number 
assigned to police duties. 
Two edicts determined the method of assigning kempei to civil police positions and 
brought about such differences in the frequency of those assignments. They were the 
Imperial Ordinances of June 1910 by which the kempei police system was established: 
(1) Imperial Ordinance No. 296, “Organization of Residency General Police Agency 
System” and (2) Imperial Ordinance No. 302, “Pertaining to Assignment to and Authority 
of the Positions of Residency General Chief of Police, Chiefs of Provincial Police, Police 
Superintendents, and Police Inspectors.” (Both, revised on 9 October 1910, after Korea’s 
formal annexation, were superseded by, respectively, Imperial Ordinances Nos. 402 and 
358. Those revisions were mainly changes in words and names, replacing, for example, 
“Kankoku” with “Chōsen” and “Residency General” with “Government General in 
Korea.” Citations from them that appear below are taken from the revised versions.) 
The relevant text can be found in (1), Article 6, which states, “The central police chief 
must be an army general who is head of the Korea (Chōsen) Kempeitai,” and Article 8, 
“Provincial police chiefs must be kempeitai field officers who head the kempei units in 
each province.” Then in (2) it is stipulated that, “In particular, the general who heads 
the Korea Kempeitai and commissioned officers can be appointed, respectively, as 
central police chief of the Government General in Korea, and provincial police chiefs 
or Government General in Korea police superintendents. Kempei warrant officers and 
noncommissioned officers can be assigned as Government General police inspectors.” 
This system of assignments distinguished appointments by kempei rank. According 
to Articles 6 and 8 in (1), the positions of central police chief (Keimu sōchō), who was the 
top commander of the police organization, and provincial police chiefs, who held the top 
police post in each province, had to be filled, respectively, by the army general serving 
as Korea kempeitai commander-in-chief, and kempei field officers serving as heads of 
the provincial kempeitai units. In the case of lower ranking kempei, however, including 
commissioned officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers, (2) stipulates 
that they “can be appointed as police superintendents (keishi) [or] police inspectors 
(keibu)” [emphasis added]; in other words, in some cases they were assigned to those 
posts, but not always. An officer named Tsushima Ikunoshin, who worked (ca. 1911–
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May 1911
Kempeitai personnel in Korea Assigned as police officers
Assign-
ment
rate
Posts
No. of 
persons
 (a)
Posts
No. of 
persons 
(b)
((b)×100/
(a))
Commissioned
officer
Army general
(Kempeitai commander)
1 Central police chief 1 100.0 
Kempei colonel 
(Provincial kempei chief)
14
Provincial police chief/
police superintendent
14 100.0 
Kempei lieutenant
(Kempei squad chief)
101 Police superintendent 101 100.0 
Warrant officer
Kempei special-duty
sergeant major
20 Police inspector 20 100.0 
Noncommissioned
officer
Kempei sergeant major 14 Police inspector 11 78.6 
Kempei sergeant 125 Police inspector 62 49.6 
Kempei corporal 337 Police inspector 28 8.3 
Total 612 Total 237 38.7 
May 1912
Kempeitai personnel in Korea Assigned as police officers
Assign-
ment
rate
Posts
No. of 
persons
 (a)
Posts
No. of 
persons
(b) 
((b)×100/
(a))
Commissioned
officer
Army general
(Kempeitai commander)
1 Central police chief 1 100.0 
Kempei colonel 
(Provincial kempei chief)
15
Provincial police chief/
 police superintendent
15 100.0 
Kempei lieutenant
(Kempei squad chief)
97 Police superintendent 95 97.9 
Warrant officer
Kempei special-duty
sergeant major
20 Police inspector 20 100.0 
Noncommissioned
officer
Kempei sergeant major 38 Police inspector 36 94.7 
Kempei sergeant 111 Police inspector 61 55.0 
Kempei corporal 284 Police inspector 42 14.8 
Total 566 Total 270 47.7 
May 1914
Kempeitai personnel in Korea Assigned as police officers
Assign-
ment
rate
Posts
No. of 
persons
 (a)
Posts
No. of 
persons
 (b)
((b)×100/
(a))
Commissioned
officer
Army general
(Kempeitai commander)
1 Central police chief 1 100.0 
Kempei colonel 
(Provincial kempei chief)
15
Provincial police chief/
police superintendent
15 100.0 
Kempei lieutenant
(Kempei squad chief)
96 Police superintendent 92 95.8 
Warrant officer
Kempei special-duty
sergeant major
20 Police inspector 20 100.0 
Noncommissioned
officer
Kempei sergeant major 53 Police inspector 53 100.0 
Kempei sergeant 251 Police inspector 229 91.2 
Kempei corporal 448 Police inspector 217 48.4 
Total 884 Total 627 70.9 
Figure 8. Rate of Kempei Officer Assignments to the Civil Police (1911–1918)
99
The Kempei Police System and Regional Control
May 1916
Kempeitai personnel in Korea Assigned as police officers
Assign-
ment
rate
Posts
No. of 
persons
 (a)
Posts
No. of 
persons
 (b)
((b)×100/
(a))
Commissioned
officer
Army general
(Kempeitai commander)
1 Central police chief 1 100.0 
Kempei colonel 
(Provincial kempei chief)
15
Provincial police chief/
police superintendent
15 100.0 
Kempei lieutenant
(Kempei squad chief)
96 Police superintendent 95 99.0 
Warrant officer
Kempei special-duty
sergeant major
20 Police inspector 20 100.0 
Noncommissioned
officer
Kempei sergeant major 52 Police inspector 52 100.0 
Kempei sergeant 250 Police inspector 234 93.6 
Kempei corporal 446 Police inspector 337 75.6 
Total 880 Total 754 85.7 
May 1918
Kempeitai personnel in Korea Assigned as police officers
Assign-
ment
rate
Posts
No. of
persons
 (a)
Posts
No. of
persons
 (b)
((b)×100/
(a))
Commissioned
officer
Army general
(Kempeitai commander)
1 Central police chief 1 100.0 
Kempei colonel 
(Provincial kempei chief)
15
Provincial police chief/
police superintendent
15 100.0 
Kempei lieutenant
(Kempei squad chief)
97 Police superintendent 96 99.0 
Warrant officer
Kempei special-duty
sergeant major
20 Police inspector 20 100.0 
Noncommissioned
officer
Kempei sergeant major 52 Police inspector 45 86.5 
Kempei sergeant 249 Police inspector 228 91.6 
Kempei corporal 445 Police inspector 296 66.5 
Total 879 Total 701 79.7 
Source: Calculated from Cabinet Printing Bureau, ed., Shokuin-roku [Personnel Directory].
Notes 
1. Personnel listed in “Army—Kempeitai stationed in Korea” in Shokuin-roku, as checked against the same 
personnel and their names under “Government General of Korea—The Central Police Headquarters and 
Provincial Police Departments” in the same directory, to compute the rate of those assigned as civil police 
officers in the kempeitai.
2. It is not known why the numbers of kempeitai personnel listed above are not necessarily the same as in Chōsen 
Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō [Annual Statistical Report of the Government General of Korea] and Rikugunshō tōkei 
nenpō [Annual Statistical Report of the Ministry of War].
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1914) as police superintendent in charge of police affairs in the Government General 
Central Police Headquarters and was extremely well-informed about the department’s 
internal affairs, wrote that, 
In the application of the special ordinance on assignments [referring to (2), 
Imperial Ordinance No. 302], the general who was kempeitai chief and kempeitai 
commissioned officers were all assigned as chief of central police, chiefs of 
provincial police, or police superintendents; and as for noncommissioned kempei 
officers, those who were needed to deal with police affairs were assigned to police 
inspector posts. To give some particulars, among noncommissioned kempei officers, 
some heads of kempei detachment stations and outstations were always assigned as 
police inspectors, while others were not.8 
What were the criteria for deciding which kempei would get civil police positions and 
which ones would not? Regarding what he said about those “needed to deal with police 
affairs,” Tsushima elaborates: “Because of the kempeitai-dominant police organization, 
the kempeitai commander-in-chief, and commissioned officers, warrant officers, and 
noncommissioned officers attached to each provincial kempeitai department were assigned 
to the leadership and executive posts in the Central Police Headquarters and to middle-
ranking positions in the provincial police departments. Assigned and deployed as police 
superintendents or inspectors, these people were ranked higher than civil police officers.” 
He goes on to explain that, as for kempei working at the lowest levels (in kempeitai 
detachment stations and outstations, for example), “When the kempei and civil police 
collaborated in police work on a contingency basis as needed, functioning, for example, as 
police guards, escorts, patrolmen, scouts, and riot police,” kempei commissioned officers, 
warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers were made police inspectors so that they 
could directly supervise and command both kempei and the civil police. 
A fundamental reason for putting kempei in civil police posts, in other words, was 
to institutionalize kempeitai control. While formerly the kempei chain of command had 
been separate, under the new arrangements kempei could now command the civil police, 
and at lower levels, kempei leaders could direct both kempei and civil police. One of the 
institutional features of the kempei police system, then, was that it placed control over the 
civil police firmly in the grip of the kempeitai, and the measure that ensured the exercise 
of such control was the system of assigning kempei to civil police posts.9 
Certainly that measure was not applied uniformly and did not have equal effect 
throughout all parts of the police organization. The kempeitai retained and enforced its 
control the most thoroughly in the section known as the higher (political) police. Among 
five sections in the Central Police Headquarters, the Higher Police was the only section 
that had a kempei officer as its chief, and the person in charge of the Higher Police in 
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the provincial police departments was always a kempei. That meant that the channel of 
communication from Central Police Headquarters chief to Higher Police section head to 
Higher Police directors in the provincial police departments was monopolized by kempei 
appointees, which made for good communication and swift, efficient action. The head 
of the Higher Police section, in fact, was the next most powerful person after the chief 
of police, which is why, when Central Police Chief Akashi was absent for a period, the 
person who took over for him temporarily was Yamagata Kan, the first chief of the Higher 
Police section in the Central Police Headquarters (Chōsen shimbun, 8 March 1911). 
The heads of the Public Peace and Order section and the Public Sanitation section, on 
the other hand, were civil police officers, with a few kempei appointees on their staffs. 
The General Affairs section and the Police Affairs section (the name of the former was 
changed to the Accounting section in 1917), which dealt mainly with internal Central 
Police Headquarters business, generally had no kempei on their staffs (except for those 
who took care of documents in the General Affairs section and provided liaison with the 
Korea kempeitai supreme command).10 
Assuming that the assignment of kempei officers to police positions can be understood 
in the way we have described above, the next question concerns to what extent Korea 
kempeitai were involved in ordinary police work. This problem must be reexamined and 
treated separately, because the primary purpose of putting kempei into police positions 
was not just to use them to get ordinary police work done, as one group of studies has 
argued it was. Kempei officers assigned to the civil police positions of superintendent or 
inspector naturally were able (legally) to do ordinary police work, but others also could 
be assigned to that work. Another edict of 10 September 1910 (3), Imperial Ordinance 
No. 343, “Provisions Pertaining to the Korea Kempeitai,” enabled those without specific 
civil police appointments to take charge of ordinary police functions. Article 3 states 
that, “The governor general of Korea stipulates that kempeitai officers with the rank of 
commissioned officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, and superior private, 
can perform the work of the civil police while maintaining the positions they currently 
hold.” 
Here, too, however, because of the particular wording, “can perform,” we have to 
assume the possibility that some of those officers did ordinary civil police work and 
some did not. What proportion of kempei personnel did those jobs? We can make a fairly 
close estimate by comparing Ministry of War records with Government General records. 
Figure 9 shows a comparison of (a) numbers of Korea kempeitai personnel as they appear 
in the Rikugunshō tōkei nenpō [Annual Statistical Report of the Ministry of War] with 
(b) numbers of “kempei detachments and kempei officers who handle the work of police 
stations” contained in the Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō [Annual Statistical Report of the 
Government General of Korea].11 
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The main generalization we can make from the data is that only about one-fourth 
of all kempei personnel were doing ordinary civil police work as of the end of 1910, 
but soon after that there seems to have been a change in the system that increased the 
proportion, so that virtually all of them were involved in such work in subsequent years.12 
What do these numbers mean? What is the significance of statistics that show such a huge 
leap beginning in 1911? Previous interpretations of the (b) total of 2,019 kempei doing 
police work for 1910 fall roughly into two schools: one takes that figure as the actual 
number of kempei and assumes that there was a radical expansion of kempei personnel 
from late 1910 into 1911,13 and the other assumes that the large difference between the 
1910 total and later is the result of statistical error.14 
In my view, neither of those interpretations can be substantiated. The first one fails 
when other materials are considered and it easily becomes apparent that the total number 
of kempei personnel was not 2,019. Apart from the War Ministry’s statistical report, from 
which the (a) numbers in Figure 9 were taken, another source supports the higher number. 
1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918
Commissioned
officer
(a) 141 135 141 151 152 151 151 150 147 
(b) 77 78 78 112 112 112 112 111 112 
Rate 54.6% 57.8% 55.3% 74.2% 73.7% 74.2% 74.2% 74.0% 76.2%
Warrant officer
(a) 24 24 24 23 24 25 25 25 25 
(b) 2 18 18 20 20 20 20 20 23 
Rate 8.3% 75.0% 75.0% 87.0% 83.3% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 92.0%
Noncommissioned
officer
(a) 805 812 812 811 812 811 811 810 811 
(b) 186 675 675 753 753 753 751 750 758 
Rate 23.1% 83.1% 83.1% 92.8% 92.7% 92.8% 92.6% 92.6% 93.5%
Private soldier
(a) 2,390 2,527 2,417 2,513 2,511 2,482 
(b) 742 2,525 2,525 2,470 2,460 2,417 2,501 2,514 2,484 
Rate 31.0% 97.7% 100.0% 99.5% 100.1% 100.1%
Kempei auxiliary
(a) 4,222 4,490 4,627 4,667 4,668 4,601 
(b) 1,012 4,453 4,473 4,603 4,626 4,627 4,657 4,737 4,601 
Rate 24.0% 102.5% 100.0% 99.8% 101.5% 100.0%
(a)Total 7,582 7,482 7,754 8,002 7,086 8,031 8,167 8,164 8,066 
(b)Total 2,019 7,749 7,769 7,958 7,971 7,929 8,041 8,132 7,978 
Rate 26.6% 103.6% 100.2% 99.5% 112.5% 98.7% 98.5% 99.6% 98.9%
Figure 9. Rate of Kempei Engaged in Civil Police Duties (1910–1918)
Sources: (a) indicates personnel listed in the Rikugunshō tōkei nenpō [Annual Statistical Report of the Ministry of 
War], including those equivalent to commissioned and noncommissioned officer in the accounting, sanitation, and 
veterinary departments. Regarding the number of private soldiers and kempei auxiliaries in the (a) category,  for 1913, 
data was augmented from Zenkoku Kenyūkai Rengōkai (National Federation of Kempeitai Veterans’ Associations), 
ed., Nihon kempei seishi [The Official History of the Japan Kempeitai], Kenbun Shoin, 1976.
Notes 
1. “Rate” indicates the proportion of those engaged in civil police duties for all the kempeitai personnel: (b)×100/(a).
2. Because private soldiers and kempei auxiliaries were not distinguished in the statistics shown in the 1911–1914 
editions of the Rikugunshō tōkei nenpō, the spaces for these are left blank. As for the number of private soldiers 
and kempei auxiliaries in the (a) category for the year 1913, a different source was used as mentioned in “Sources” 
above.
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In June 1910 just before annexation, Resident General Terauchi requested the Japanese 
government to boost the Korea kempeitai by 1,000 men. According to the latter source, 
at that time Terauchi observed that the current status of personnel was, in addition to over 
5,200 policemen, “more than 2,300 kempei and 4,500 kempei auxiliaries.”15 That means 
that by the end of the year, with the additional forces sent from Japan, there must have 
been 3,300 kempei and 4,500 auxiliaries, which would bring the kempeitai total to 7,800. 
Or, like the other view, we could presume that the number 2,019 for “kempei …who 
handle the work of police stations” appearing in the 1910 Government General statistical 
report is simply some kind of statistical error. But there is evidence enough to refute that 
hypothesis, too. The recently reissued official history produced by the Korea Kempeitai, 
Chōsen kempeitai rekishi [History of the Korea Kempeitai], gives two parallel figures: a 
chart showing late December 1910 numbers for “Korea Kempeitai Regular Personnel and 
Horses Deployment” puts the total at 7,832 men, and then 2,019 appears for “numbers of 
kempei detachments and kempei personnel carrying out the duties of police stations” in 
the same month and year.16 That is an extremely large difference between two numbers 
appearing parallel to each other in the same source, both related to the end of 1910. The 
most logical way to interpret it is to conclude that at that point in time only 2,019 out of a 
total of around 7,800 kempei were engaged in ordinary civil police work. In other words, 
nowhere were nearly all of the Korea kempei doing such work. 
Now, how do we explain the abrupt increase that made the 26.6 percent of kempei in 
police jobs in late 1910 jump up the following year to hover around 100 percent for the 
next eight years? Materials that might illuminate the concerns, aims, and intentions that 
motivated changes in the way the kempei police system operated are extremely hard to 
find. But we can learn something by looking at a certain shift of focus occurring around 
1910 in the work and deployment of the kempei police. Whereas the kempeitai at first 
concentrated on suppressing the Righteous Armies of the resistance movement, at this 
point their work increasingly involved regulating certain areas in the everyday lives of 
Koreans. I believe that shift occasioned a new commitment throughout the kempeitai to 
perform ordinary civil police jobs on a much wider scale and can therefore account for 
the statistics we have been examining.
To elaborate, let us look first at the “open formation” or decentralized deployment 
policy of the kempei police that was implemented beginning in October 1911. Its major 
effect was to expand the kempeitai presence to 254 additional locations and add 197 
more civil police agencies to the current number. That raised the total number of kempei 
police facilities by 140 percent.17 After the first big wave of additional facilities under 
the decentralized deployment policy, the annual rate of increase for both kempei and 
police facilities was approximately 5 percent or less than the previous year. Even the 
total number of facilities added between 1912 and 1918 was lower than the level of 
expansion carried out in the one year spanning 1910–1911. What this tells us is that once 
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the decentralized deployment of October 1911 had been carried out, the foundation of the 
kempei police was essentially in place. 
Decentralized deployment affected staff as well as location. Formerly 3–5 men who 
were either noncommissioned officers or superior privates and 4–6 auxiliaries staffed 
the lowest-level kempeitai outstations (bunkensho) and dispatch camps (hakensho), but 
measures taken under decentralized deployment cut personnel in each location to 5–6 
in all. And the 5–10 or more policemen and assistant patrolmen who had manned the 
civil police substations were reduced to 1–2 policemen and 3–4 assistant patrolmen.18 
Reducing staff at each location while increasing the number of locations invited 
complaints from the working staff, and it also generated problems of communication 
among low-level posts, hindered supervision of lower-ranking police officers, and so 
forth.19 At the same time, these measures were also seen as a way to “shorten the distance 
between police or kempei stations (staffed by kempei, police, or both) …. [and] broaden 
police powers” (comment by Ozawa Hisashi, head of South P’yŏngan Provincial Police 
Department and Pyŏngyang Kempeitai chief. [Chōsen shimbun, 1 April 1913]). In any 
case, the decentralized deployment policy of 1911 split up both kempeitai and civil police 
into more numerous, smaller units and spread them out more widely, and without doubt 
it enabled them to penetrate deeper into local society. It is very likely that these changes 
in patterns of deployment worked to increase the proportion of kempei doing ordinary 
civil police work. 
The second significant point is that the various laws that would define and shape the 
kempei police sphere of duties were just becoming operative in that period. A barrage 
of regulations had already been fired off around the time of the annexation, legalizing 
restrictions on meetings, public gatherings, business transactions, and so forth, and 
they were followed by more curbs based on the Ordinance on the Swift Adjudication of 
Crimes (December 1910); the Ordinance on Civil Suits and Arbitration (also December 
1910); the Ordinance on Punishment by the Flogging (March 1912); and the Rules on the 
Punishment of Police Offenses (March 1912) that stipulated detailed items to be closely 
monitored in everyday life. Together, these decrees, regulations, and laws extended the 
judicial power of the kempei police substantially and provided institutionalized backing 
to “kempei rule.” In effect, that concentrated string of decrees instituted an organized set 
of legal measures enabling the kempei police to clamp down even on everyday offenses. 
For example, the Rules on the Punishment of Police Offenses covered a wide spectrum 
of misdemeanors, big and small, so that they “served not only as a ‘public order act’ 
to control anti-Japanese activities,” but they also aimed at “searching out ‘suspicious 
persons,’ controlling ‘group activities,’ and adjusting ‘economic and cultural troubles’” 
between Japanese and Koreans, and so forth.20 Going back to the main point of this 
section, the establishment of this legal network is further indication that an important 
shift was taking place, wherein policing activities moved out of the stage when they had 
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focused on suppressing the anti-Japanese armed resistance and into a new phase. Now, 
each in their own district, the kempei police began exerting constant, probing control 
over even the smallest aspects of the daily lives of the local Korean populations. 
Other scholars have investigated the practices of assigning kempei to police positions 
and empowering kempei to do police work, arrangements that, as we have seen, formed 
the backbone of the kempei police system. But in the previous research no distinction 
was made between assignments of kempei to police positions and kempei’s performance 
of police work. They were different, in fact, and the difference is significant in analyzing 
the history of this period. To begin with, the two types of assignments were governed by 
two separate sets of laws, and those two sets of laws were designed for different purposes. 
Kempei were assigned to civil police positions in accord with two Imperial Ordinances 
(together with later revisions), one pertaining to the organization of Residency General 
(later revised to Government General) police force officers and police stations (No. 
296), and the other pertaining to the Residency General (later revised) chief of police; 
assignment to and authority of the positions of the chiefs of provincial police; police 
superintendents, and police inspectors (No. 302). The purpose of these two ordinances 
(and their revisions) was to place kempei officers in a legal position of authority to 
command the civil police within the police agencies, focusing on the Higher Police 
section. Appointments to those posts were limited to one group of upper-echelon kempei 
officers. It is perfectly clear that not all kempei personnel were given such assignments. 
Performance of ordinary police work was determined according to Imperial 
Ordinance No. 343, “Provisions Pertaining to the Korea Kempeitai” (promulgated 10 
September 1910). The way this ordinance was applied changed greatly from 1910 into 
1911, as demonstrated in the enormous leap in numbers; the proportion of kempei engaged 
in ordinary police business jumped from about one-quarter of the total in late 1910, to 
100 percent a few months later. As to the reasons for that rapid involvement of virtually 
the entire corps, we can presume that it came about partly as a result of decentralized 
deployment, which was implemented at that time, and having kempei perform civil 
police duties made it possible to exert much wider, more thorough, consolidated control. 
The other important factor was a series of laws and decrees that went into effect in the 
same period and provided stronger and more efficient means to regulate a multitude of 
everyday activities. These developments underlay a shift in the operation of the entire 
policing system, moving kempei into police jobs and putting them in charge of broad 
areas of ordinary police work. 
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2. The Government General’s Perception of Security 
Conditions 
This section looks at the perception of Korea’s security, stability, and order by top 
officials in the Government General during the 1910s—it examines their views on what 
was happening, what was needed, what was in store in the future. As we will see, they 
saw things differently as certain events unfolded. An analysis of how their views changed 
will help us better understand the institutional structure of the kempei police system 
discussed in the previous section, and it will also give us a clearer idea of what the lower-
level kempei police actually did—and why—which we will discuss more fully in the 
following section. 
There was a shift in Governor General Terauchi’s thinking about public order and 
security shortly after annexation. Let us first take up an event closely related to that shift, 
namely, his resignation in August 1911 from the concurrent post he held as minister of 
war, leaving him in office only as governor general. 
For a short time after Korea was annexed, Terauchi seems to have felt some 
reassurance about the prospects for stability and peace in the colony. The annexation 
had been accomplished without widespread insurrections or violence by the Righteous 
Armies, and Terauchi wrote to elder statesman Yamagata Aritomo, “Conditions have been 
largely peaceful since [the annexation] …. I had all the heads of the provincial police 
departments report to me, and according to their information, the Korean populace are 
tranquil. In some places apparently Japanese and Koreans even hold parties together.”21 
News from the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Korea Garrison Army was also good: 
“Seoul as well as the countryside are both genuinely serene …. Mob rioting no longer 
occurs…. [All that remains] is to capture the ringleaders.”22 As we saw in Section 3 
of the first chapter, violent uprisings by the Righteous Armies in the late phase of the 
resistance movement during 1907 and after, ground down by suppression mainly by Korea 
kempeitai, had started to fade out even before the annexation was finally accomplished. 
Just before the annexation, Akashi Motojirō, chief of Government General Central 
Police Headquarters (and concurrently commander-in-chief of the Korea Kempeitai) also 
observed that, “As far as I can see, in general, the rebel revolts by now have run their 
course.”23 He made that comment in a talk to the provincial police chiefs (concurrently 
chiefs of the provincial kempeitai units), but then he went on to urge the utmost caution, 
instructing the officers to be always vigilant in watching for anarchist and socialist ideas 
and for any signs of “nascent secret societies.” The tightening of command authority by 
the kempeitai over the Higher (political) Police that was discussed in the previous section 
undoubtedly reflected this critical, extremely wary view. 
Then, in the middle of 1911, about a year after annexation, clearly some kind of 
change was taking place in the way Governor General Terauchi and others responsible for 
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Korea’s stability and order saw the security conditions in Korea. In May 1911 Terauchi 
sent a letter to Yamagata in which he expressed his desire to resign as war minister and 
as governor general: 
If it should so happen that Prince Katsura [Prime Minister Katsura Tarō] resigns, 
I, too, if it is possible, would like to be allowed to retire from both the positions I 
currently hold. As you are aware, for ten years now I have humbly tried to serve as 
minister of war …. The future in Korea promises to be extremely difficult, and I feel 
wretchedly, unendurably miserable. I wish to be allowed to resign from both my 
positions.24 
Terauchi requested permission to quit both positions, citing his decade-long tenure as 
minister of war (he took that post in March 1902), and the “extreme difficulty” he foresaw 
in Korea that would make it intolerable to stay on as governor general. Prime Minister 
Katsura felt threatened by this: if Terauchi were free to become prime minister, a new 
generation in the Yamagata faction would come forth in greater strength. After talking 
it over with Hara Takashi, an extremely influential figure of the Seiyūkai political party, 
Katsura agreed to let Terauchi step down as war minister, but he dissuaded him from 
leaving the governor generalship, and in the end Terauchi went along.25 He remained in 
office only as governor general, but his perception of the Korean situation was gloomy as 
ever. Then, about halfway through 1912, he vented deep frustration in a letter to Katsura, 
saying, “The longer I have been in Korea, the greater my hardship has become.”26 
Events related to kempei police efforts to squash underground movements and secret 
societies, for one thing, seem to have had something to do with Terauchi’s shift from 
optimism after annexation, and then into gloom over Korea’s security and stability. In 
particular, he was probably shaken by linked incidents that later came to be called the 
“Anak Conspiracy” and the “Case of the 105.” Those incidents led to mass arrests in 1910 
of alleged partisans and anti-Japanese nationalists, and they were followed by serious 
ramifications. Central Police Chief Akashi’s program of stamping out secret societies and 
other underground organizations was first put fully into action with the Anak Conspiracy 
(in December 1910), which centered on the arrest of An Myǒng-gŭn (brother of Itō 
Hirobumi’s assassin), who was accused of crimes in connection with his money-raising 
for the independence movement. A plot to assassinate Governor General Terauchi was 
fabricated by the police and was used as the pretext to begin rounding up more than 600 
Koreans in September 1911, 105 of whom, including An, were indicted. These events were 
at the center of a determined effort by the Government General to choke off clandestine 
activities of the Sinminhoe (New People’s Association), a nationalist group founded in 
1907 that was pivotal in the independence movement. The arrests and conspiracy trials 
in the Case of the 105 (many among the 105 were Sinminhoe leaders) decimated the 
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organization, for many of its members had been arrested and it was effectively crushed. 
The details of both incidents are well documented elsewhere,27 but let me point out 
elements they had in common. In both cases, those targeted by the police were activists 
and underground organizations considered part of the Patriotic Enlightenment Movement, 
a campaign that had taken root in the northern, heavily Christian part of Korea to promote 
education, native industry, Korean-run commerce, and so forth. Also in each case, the 
kempei police had already written the fabricated “plot” of a conspiracy beforehand and 
used torture to make it turn out as they planned. In mid-1912 Terauchi wrote to Yamagata 
regarding the trials of the 105, 
The preliminary investigations of the assassins that have been going on since last 
year have been concluded, and a hundred plus several dozen of the arrested will go 
to trial this time. Public trials of those people will begin at the end of this month, 
and when the trials start it will be hard to predict what kind of action their partisan 
sympathizers, who are spread out all over the country, will take. The best we can do 
is to be thoroughly prepared. Since before annexation their objective …. [has been] 
to take back national sovereignty. For that reason, more than the sympathizers and 
their ilk inside the country, we have to be extremely vigilant about the ones living 
outside the country in exile, while carefully watching those within.28 
A sense of urgent anxiety resounds in this letter, in its stress on the stringent 
precautions that Terauchi believed were needed to deal with the numerous “partisan 
sympathizers,” within and outside Korea, who supported the “assassins” being tried in 
court, and whose aim was no less than to “take back national sovereignty.” Around that 
time, Terauchi had visited P’yǒngyang where most of those arrested in the Case of the 
105 had been sent, and he related what he had felt on his visit there: “Korea’s long-term 
prospects look only discouraging.”29 Presumably Terauchi and others in the Government 
General all knew from the trials of the 105 that the Sinminhoe had been building a 
large-scale base for the independence movement in China and elsewhere. Terauchi must 
have felt deep despair to contemplate the sheer persistence and undaunted resilience of 
the independence movement activists at home and abroad, and to have no end in sight 
of the trouble bound to come from Christians and others, who took courage from the 
movement and simply refused to give up. Police Superintendent Kunitomo Naokane, 
who was in charge of secret operations in the Higher Police section in the Central Police 
Headquarters, led the investigation and arrests of the 105. In his opinion, “All our present 
efforts, great as they are, to Japanize the Korean populace …. will have no effect,” and he 
added that, “Dangerous situations such as rioting will not occur, but I fear that like this 
incident, crimes are going to break out frequently in the future.”30
There was another, equally ominous event that unsettled the already tense 
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Government General executives as they considered what had to be done to ensure 
security and order. That was the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution (1911) in China, 
erupting in the Wuhang uprising on October 10th that year. What impact would it have? 
China’s neighbors in Korea were intensely interested in and concerned about the Xinhai 
Revolution. Their reactions varied. Some concentrated on the ideals of the revolution, 
and others focused on Japanese policy toward China: Was it good or bad, constructive or 
destructive? To many Koreans, whether or not the revolution would have a detrimental 
effect on their economic life was the paramount concern (this issue will be discussed in 
Section 3 of the next chapter). The Xinhai Revolution created deep psychological unease 
among Koreans, who felt it directly, but only for a short time. Knowing how this event 
could galvanize Koreans, however, the Government General must have experienced acute 
apprehension about its ability to maintain stability and control. At that time Ishizuka Eizō, 
general affairs director of the Government General, related in a letter to Terauchi the 
feelings of Koreans in connection with the Xinhai Revolution, such as: “It was lucky that 
Japan went right ahead and annexed Korea last year; if they had tried to do it this year, it 
would have been really difficult,” and “It was very unfortunate for the Korean people that 
Korea was unavoidably annexed by Japan.” In Ishizuka’s analysis, the Chinese revolution 
was a catalyst to bring Korean anti-Japanese feeling out into the open.31
After a brief interlude when Governor General Terauchi might have felt some relief 
knowing that the guerilla resistance had been virtually crushed, some time in 1911 he 
had the painful realization that now a different kind of security problem loomed on the 
horizon. Likewise, the kempei police (whose specific functions are discussed in the next 
section) steadily shifted their focus from consciously organized groups of activists to the 
wider popular consciousness, which was a breeding ground of such dangerous activities.
There can be little doubt that the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and the wave 
of socially radical currents of thought that it unleashed exerted a decisive influence on 
the thinking of the governor general and everyone responsible for order in Korea in the 
late 1910s. Upon the start of the war rumors abounded about how the war would affect 
everyday life, about the possible conscription of Koreans, and so forth. Indeed, the second 
half of the 1910s saw signs of change and agitation everywhere. On the economic front, in 
1916 the price of rice and other commodities shot up, leaving many poor farmers in dire 
straits and sending rising numbers away from the farm to wage labor jobs. Determined to 
improve their society, Koreans with new ideas tried to take action. One group of people, 
building on their success in business and finance, set out to create an economic base for 
a bourgeois nationalism. Another were the Korean students who had gone to Japan to 
study after the annexation and now, in the latter part of the 1910s, were coming back to 
Korea. In parallel efforts, these people launched themselves into the project of getting rid 
of the old society and building a modern, stronger Korea. Thus emerged a class of new 
intelligentsia well grounded in Western culture who began to influence ways of thinking 
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in Korea.32 
How did the Government General view these socio-economic developments and 
new ideas? Japan quickly declared war on Germany in August 1914, and at that time 
Governor General Terauchi gave instructions to his staff, stating forcefully that the war 
“cannot influence Korea,” and urging the officials and police under him to “prevent 
people from becoming panicked.”33 At the 1916 conference of provincial police chiefs, 
Terauchi voiced his concerns more concretely: “With the advancement of the times, 
noticeable improvements are finally being made in private enterprise and other areas, 
but at the same time, as often happens, a mood of frivolity is setting in and people are 
picking up wasteful, extravagant habits. This cannot be helped to some extent, but it 
has already gone too far and I am exceedingly concerned.”34 Speaking at the conference 
of provincial police chiefs at the beginning of 1917, Hasegawa Yoshimichi, who had 
succeeded Terauchi as governor general the previous October, was also explicit when he 
cautioned the officers to be on the watch for agitation instigated by “those people with 
their new education who dare to act in outrageous ways.”35 
References appearing in Terauchi’s address to the spread of “private enterprise,” for 
example, and his worry about a new, unrestrained “mood of frivolity” express views that 
the kempei police shared. Early in 1916 Nakano Arimitsu, director of the central police 
security section, made the point that, “There has been great progress in society in these past 
few years, but we cannot afford to ignore the changes also taking place in the thinking of the 
people at large and in the economy, as well.” Elaborating, he said, “The influences reaching 
into the Korean people’s worldview have become an exceptionally significant phenomenon” 
(Keijō nippō, 5 January 1916). Coming from the provinces, an opinion voiced around the 
same time by the head of the Yongsan Kempei detachment,  Yano Sukezō, begins to sound 
truly anxious. In response to an enquiry from Seoul, he wrote, “As for Koreans, first of all, 
in the realm of ideas all is deteriorating into chaos, and I think that no time has been worse 
than now …. Christianity is being preached by foreign missionaries …. and wrong ideas 
passed on by bad elements among the believers are winning over the intellectuals, which 
is creating serious obstacles to governing.” He continued, “The industrial policy has made 
possible solid improvement in the quality of material life since annexation …. and because 
of that the common people have developed more cultivated tastes,” but in comparison, he 
concluded tersely, “their way of thinking remains as it was before.”36
We will now examine a source that is more practical and closer to the ground, and 
that is an internal report called “Kannai jōkyō hōkoku” [Report on Conditions in the 
Sakju District], produced at the Sakju Kempei Outstation37 (hereafter “Report”). In the 
view of the Report, the roughly 35,000 people who lived in Sakju were doing well: their 
“financial and economic situation” was good; they enjoyed “great abundance after several 
years in a row of extremely productive harvests, and the conditions this year also portend 
an increase of about 10 percent over last year.” Their production of silk thread, among 
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other things, was prospering, and “the rural economy is very strong and continues to 
grow. In particular, ordinary farmers are growing more wealthy” (Report, sheets 31–32).
The Report documents the pulsing social and intellectual currents. “The way people feel 
has changed so vastly,” it says, referring to “great changes in popular attitudes about education 
…. In both town and country people have become intensely enthusiastic for education; they 
are loudly declaring the need for schooling” (Report, sheets 8, 30). It describes many kinds 
of new developments, including voluntary enrollment of children of school age into general 
schools, a spurt in demand for girls’ education, a proliferation of small-scale private schools 
(sŏdang) in response to the new education, and others, and it notes the rising interest in ideas, 
such as “thoughts on rights,” “sense of duty,” and “the spread of rule by law.” Then the 
Report concludes that all these were “benefits of [Japanese] imperial rule.” This narrative 
conveys the strong sense at that time of “great changes in popular attitudes about education” 
and confidence that they could be handled within the framework of colonial rule. This view 
presumably was shared by local educational authorities.38 
At the same time, the Report did not neglect to describe a tendency among younger 
intellectuals that was troubling: “Some of the graduates of elementary schools or other 
schools who have had contact with Japanese, and some of those with some education 
who want to become civil servants, have extravagant and lavish tastes …. they have lost 
the moderation, practicality, and realism that is needed by the new government” (Report, 
sheet 22). As for the growing popularity of Christianity, the Report says that, “We are 
always keeping an eye on the words and actions of the pastors and missionaries who are 
proselytizing …. [but] we see no signs these days of subversion or unlawful behavior” 
(Report, sheet 14). In their view of the peace and security situation in Korea, it is clear 
that Japanese officials at all levels were keenly aware of rising Korean standards of living 
on the economic side, and on the other side, the intellectual ferment that was being stirred 
by new currents of thought.
Two events at the end of World War I that were to have an incalculable impact 
on colonial Korea were the 1917 October Revolution in Russia and the establishment 
in November of a socialist/communist government under Lenin, and the enunciation of 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in January 1918, in which the American president 
declared the principle of national self-determination. Those events, which generated 
movements all over the world to free people from colonial bondage, were ample reason 
for anyone involved in maintaining peace and order in Korea to experience a new level of 
anxiety and feel a greater need for vigilance. 
In January 1919, Central Police Headquarters banned the publication in newspapers 
of any article concerning national self-determination or the Paris Peace Conference, where 
the Fourteen Points were being negotiated.39 On 15 February, Kempeitai Commander-in-
Chief (=Central Police Chief) Kojima Sōjirō addressed the provincial kempeitai heads 
(=provincial police chiefs) in the following way. 
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Since the collapse of the Russian and German empires, he said, “new revolutionary 
ideas” and “voices calling for self-determination” have been spreading among colonial 
peoples all over the world. Turning to conditions in Korea, “Our so-called benevolent 
government has not yet received praise by all people. We cannot but assume that 
dissatisfaction and discontent are always lying hidden.” Among “people wandering 
abroad” especially “students going to Japan …. quite a number of them are planning and 
working to develop and build greater force in conspiratorial collaboration with people in 
Korea.” He added, “All kinds of gossip and rumors are flying around about the death of 
Emperor Kojong [died January 1918] and they are shocking and infuriating Koreans.” 
Foreseeing what would happen in Korea, Kojima cautioned the police heads:
What we have to be most acutely attentive to is the infiltration of revolutionary 
new ideas and the spread of thoughts of national self-determination …. people’s 
thinking can change unpredictably; and that kind of change and the movement led by 
activists outside Korea could rouse sympathy from the world powers. Not only that, 
spreading ideas that capitalize on the new situation can very quickly sway public 
opinion and make it extremely difficult to keep control. It is not difficult to see this 
in the future.40
 
Kojima stresses the need for the utmost vigilance, knowing what troubles powerful 
revolutionary ideas and idealism about national self-determination could bring to 
Korea. He was proved right when, two weeks later, surrounded by the upheaval of the 
Samil Uprising, Korea’s rulers found it “extremely difficult to keep control.” Some 
contemporary studies make the point that the Government General did not really see the 
uprising coming until just before it broke out, and it is probably true that they did not 
know about the concrete plans for the printing and distribution of the Proclamation of 
Independence. But the kempei police were well aware of the intellectual currents that fed 
and drove the momentum of the movement, and they had been sensing a crisis coming 
for some time. 
However, that sense of crisis did not translate into an urgent project to strengthen the 
system of maintaining order. The general opinion was, in fact, that if anything, the system 
should be downsized. In a March 1917 letter to Prime Minister Terauchi (he became 
prime minister in November 1916), Central Police Chief Furumi Izushio expressed the 
idea that, “We should not let the police organization in Korea just stay as it was at the 
time of annexation, as you well know, and therefore we should further reduce it and 
reorganize it,” and he indicated that they had already started to restructure it in January 
that year.41 At every available opportunity, the Ministry of War, also, since the annexation, 
had been making known its opinion that the Korea kempeitai should be reduced. Then 
in February 1919 Minister of War Tanaka Giichi stated during Diet interpellations that at 
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present, given the potential for instability arising from the Russian Revolution, he was 
opposed to pulling out the entire kempeitai force from Korea, but he was considering 
reducing the amount of funding for it (see Section 1, Chapter Five). The actual budget 
for the police around that time shows that, because of ramifications from the war boom, 
the Government General’s financial policy was showing signs of becoming expansionary, 
beginning in fiscal 1918, and there was an increase in police funding, but none of that was 
targeted for added staff or expansion of facilities.42
The people who ruled Korea believed that they could do both—respond to the 
rising intellectual ferment among the Korean people and at the same time downsize the 
kempeitai. But the imminent Samil Uprising would completely overturn that kind of 
thinking, and the final outcome would be the dismantling of the kempei police system. 
We will discuss this in Chapter Five. 
3. The Work of the Kempei Police in the Local Areas:
 The Case of Kangwŏndo Province
To recapitulate, soon after the annexation, the kempei-dominated police organization was 
used to establish a system that would put kempei into the ordinary jobs of the civil police. 
Around the same time the Government General leadership, now that the anti-Japanese 
insurgency had been effectively extinguished, began concentrating more on how to deal 
with secret societies, religions, and so forth—the kind of activity that was handled by 
the higher police. As a result, the administrative load of the police expanded to include a 
raft of jobs ranging from higher police types of functions to the chores of explaining and 
enforcing the rules that Koreans were supposed to follow in their daily lives. This section 
examines a document in Chōsen chūsatsu kempeitai shiryō with the title “Keimukikan 
kaigi kannai jōkyō shimon tekiyō” [Summaries from the Conference of Provincial Police 
Agencies: Reports and Responses to Enquires on Provincial Conditions] edited by the 
Ch’unch’ŏn Kempei Unit, under the Kangwŏn Provincial Police Department (June 
1913). (Hereafter “Summary.”) In this section, using Kangwŏndo as a case study, we will 
explore what the kempei police actually did and how they performed their assorted duties 
in the first half of the 1910s.
First, concerning the nature of the document itself and its value as a source, let me 
begin by explaining its provenance as a report generated by a police conference. The 
main kempei police policy guidelines for maintaining stability and order were decided at 
important conferences that were held on both the national and provincial levels. Meeting 
usually for five days, the heads of all the provincial police departments gathered in Seoul 
for the most part, once a year. During a typical conference, on the first and second days 
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the governor general and the vice governor general would each address the group, and 
after that the Central Police Headquarters chief, acting as chairman, presided over the 
delivery of reports on conditions in each province; next, the central police chief gave 
advice and directives (day 3); that was followed by discussions of the wishes and opinions 
of the police in each province and meetings with related agencies (days 4 and 5).43 Since 
all of the provincial police chiefs doubled as provincial kempeitai heads, usually they 
held a meeting after the police conference to discuss matters related to military policing. 
That year, in June 1913 when the Summary was produced, both the conference and the 
meeting afterward took place. 
After the national-level police conference, the provincial police chiefs each 
brought the results of the conference back to his own province. The heads of the kempei 
detachments and outstations and police station heads within the province met—in most 
cases the following month—to discuss the results. This meeting, also, was a five-day 
affair with a schedule that typically began with reports from the assembled participants 
on conditions within their jurisdictions (day 1), and that was followed by enquiries and 
responses, and directives and advice (day 2); consider possible action on opinion and 
request items (day 3); business matters with related officials, and consider possible action 
on directives and advice and on opinion and request items for each kempeitai jurisdiction 
(day 4), and finally enquiries and responses on military police affairs in the kempeitai 
jurisdiction (day 5).44 
The Summary contains the proceedings of the provincial-level conference of kempei 
detachment and outstation heads 
and police station heads in 
Kangwŏndo in June 1913. It has 
121 sheets45 and is printed by the 
hectograph method. It contains 
reports made by the heads of 
the agencies in the Kangwŏndo 
police department—six kempei 
detachments, three outstations, 
and its five police stations—on 
conditions in their jurisdictions, as 
well as the record of the questions 
from the Kwangwŏn provincial 
police chief (=Ch’unch’ŏn 
kempeitai chief; at that time it was 
Major Nasu Tasaburō) and their 
answers, including much animated 
argument about the content of the 
T’ongch’ŏn
Hoeyang
Kimsŏng
Kosŏng
Kansŏng
Inje
Yangyang
Kangnŭng
Chŏngsŏn
P’yonghae
Yŏngwŏl
Uljin
Ch’unch’ŏn
Wŏnju
P’yongchang
Note: The counties indicate where kempei detachments, out stations, 
and police stations were located.
Kangwŏndo province
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kempei police work and the policies and guidelines the officers followed in performing 
their jobs. 
The Summary brings up a welter of issues. Kangwŏndo was one of the centers of 
the conflict with the Righteous Armies during the few years leading up to the annexation, 
and even after annexation the kempei police kept up the pressure on hold-out guerilla 
resistance with considerably more persistence than in other provinces.46 Policemen used 
disguises and other covert means to seek out the rebels, and kempei on special duty 
exploited the widely-dispersed smaller policing facilities to patrol the region on a daily 
basis, including night patrols, going even into the most remote places.47 Actual armed 
clashes with the guerilla fighters were few, however,48 and in July 1915 when Ch’oe 
Ǔnŏn, their leader, was captured, the campaign to wipe out the Righteous Armies was 
finally over.  
Police work in these times consisted of much more than pursuing and trying 
to suppress Righteous Army bands, however. In the words of one provincial police 
chief, “If you see things the way a policemen does, in this job we seem to have to 
deal with just about everything in life” (response from the provincial police head 
to a comment from the Wŏnju kempei detachment head, 87. Here and below the 
reference numbers indicate the sheet or “envelope page” number in the Summary). 
The kempei police put their hands to all kinds of things, many times acting as 
auxiliaries for government agencies. The kinds of work they did that are mentioned 
in the Summary appear in Figure 10. Taking only examples that the multiple police 
agencies referred to in their reports, we will now look concretely at what the kempei 
police did in Kangwŏndo. 
Let us begin with the monitoring of religion and education, two areas related to 
higher police work in which many participants showed great interest. Regarding 
religion, activities by Confucianists, Buddhists, members of a pro-Japanese group called 
Sich’ŏn’gyo—all of them were watched. A small number were considered to require 
particularly close surveillance, and the one that received their most concentrated attention 
was Christianity. Kangwŏndo was slow to absorb new cultural influences; a Confucian-
based anti-Japanese feeling and a type of nationalism stemming from Chundoism, tended 
to be much stronger there than in other provinces,49 but kempei surveillance focused 
on Christianity. In the course of their routine activities, kempei would often encounter 
something in the words or behavior of Christians that was disturbing. The Summary 
details many such instances, describing, for example, how Christians did not really 
listen when lectured by the police but just sneered, and how the Christians “welcome 
Koreans anytime” to the church, but “they don’t accept a kempei or an auxiliary” (Head 
of P’yŏnghae kempei outstation, 47; Provincial police chief responding to Wŏnju kempei 
detachment head, 82). The provincial police chief gave the following advice about how 
to respond to Christians: 
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Type of duties
Kempei agency Civil police agency
TotalDetachment Outstation Police station
Inje Hoeyang Kosŏng Wŏnju Yŏngwŏl Uljin Kangsŏng Chŏngsŏn P’yŏnghae Yangyang Kangnǔng P’yŏngchang Kimsŏng T’ongch’ŏn
Religion
Surveillance of Christians ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 5
Monitoring of activities of 
Confucianists ○ 1
Monitoring
of pseudo-religions ○ 1
Education
Supervision of village 
schools (sŏdang) ○ ○ ○ ○ 4
Supervision of private 
schools ○ ○ ○ 3
Encouragement of
Japanese-language learning ○ ○ ○ 3
Surveillance of graduates of 
technical schools ○ 1
Road construction ○ ○ 2
Sanitation
Establishment
of sanitation unions ○ ○ 2
Medical activities
by police doctors ○ ○ 2
Well-digging ○ 1
Quarantine ○ 1
Land and 
forestry
Measures against hwajŏn 
cultivation ○ ○ ○ ○ 4
Forest conservation ○ ○ 2
Recognition of common 
lands ○ 1
Crime 
measures
Crackdown on gambling ○ ○ ○ 3
Surveillance of scribes  ○ 1
Encour-
agement 
of activi-
ties
Tax payment, saving,
and employment ○ ○ ○ ○ 4
Raising of national flags ○ 1
Participation in the Red 
Cross and the Women’s 
Patriotic Association
○ 1
Other
Grasp of export
and import statistics ○ ○ 2
Measurement of rainfall ○ 1
Arbitration of civil suits ○ 1
Survey of hot springs ○ 1
Enhancement
of legal knowledge ○ 1
Survey of registration ○ 1
Preservation of cultural 
assets ○ 1
Fire fighting ○ 1
Control of settlers
in border regions ○ 1
Figure 10. List of Duties Mentioned in the “Summary”
Source: Compiled from “Keimukikan kaigi kannai jōkyō shimon tekiyō” [Summaries of the Conference of Provincial Police Agencies: Reports 
and Responses to Enquires on Provincial Conditions], edited by the Ch’unch’ŏn Kempei Unit, under the Kangwŏn Provincial Police Department 
(June 1913).
Note: The circles indicate that duties in question are mentioned for specific kempei/police stations.
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Freedom of religion is recognized in Korea and in Japan alike …. Naturally a 
policeman is duty-bound to discipline someone if he undermines public morals or 
breaks the law, but you have to think about timing or you risk angering the Korean 
unnecessarily and that could make it difficult to keep order … you cannot be too 
strict, and you cannot be too lenient. You [policemen] need to use your own judgment 
about this (Provincial police chief to P’yŏnghae kempei outstation head, 48).
This police chief was encouraging the police to watch out for acts by Christians 
that might cause a social disturbance, but not to go too far and aggravate them, for that 
could make it more difficult to keep the Koreans under control. This caution against too 
quickly resorting to one-sided repression was related to the experience of the Case of the 
105. In that incident torture was used to extract false confessions, and since early the year 
before (1912) a group of American missionaries and the American press had protested. 
Both Governor General Terauchi and Police Chief Akashi heard such criticisms directly 
and indirectly. The issue of using overly repressive measures with Christians had been 
brought up at the national-level conference of provincial police heads that preceded the 
Kangwŏndo conference of kempei unit and police station heads.50 
Underlying their policy toward Christians was the idea that a few leaders—often, 
in this case, Christians they judged to be “upper class”—could influence many people. 
Apparently kempei police surveillance often used methods of “secret spying” in their 
investigations (Provincial police chief to T’ongch’ŏn police station head, 70). They 
sought information on numbers of missionaries and believers, their words and acts, 
and the social class of the believers, among others. In order to determine the “social 
class” of believers, they acquired information on “their financial assets and how much 
education they had,” and then the kempei police would compare that data with the results 
of surveys they had made of individual households and their members. On the basis of 
that combined information they sought to categorize believers as “upper class” or “lower 
class” (Yangyang police station chief and T’ongch’ŏn police station chief, 26, 27, 69, 
70). Why they took this approach was explained in terms of the metaphorical yangban: 
“If there are ten or twelve clever yangban they can use every possible opportunity to 
gather innocent believers and fill them with seditious thoughts” (Provincial police chief 
to T’ongch’ŏn police station head, 70). The kempei feared that a handful of “upper class” 
Christians could spread their “seditious thoughts” among the many more numerous 
“lower class” Christians. 
The activities of the kempei police related to education branched out considerably. 
The watchful mistrust they demonstrated toward Christians was, in education, directed 
toward private schools, which were strongly influenced by Christianity. The number 
of private schools in Kangwŏndo was comparatively small (as of March 1914 the total 
number of all kinds of private schools in Korea was 1,207, and of that, 38 were in 
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Kangwŏndo). The lowest-level kempei police made minute surveys of the private schools 
in their respective districts to cull information on the numbers of teachers and students, 
subjects taught, and facilities and property of each school (Hoeyang and Yŏngwŏl kempei 
detachment heads and head of the Kansŏng kempei outstation, 15–17, 57, 77). One 
detachment head talked about some of the ways kempei police maintained coordination 
with administrative agencies, saying that in this job, kempei “sometimes stop in at private 
schools and more traditional village schools (sŏdang) where they monitor and encourage 
the children. Sometimes they censor textbooks…. They always keep in contact with the 
principal and the administrators, so at any time they can talk with them about school 
affairs” (Hoeyang kempei detachment head, 57). 
Kempei police likewise surveyed the village schools, which were small-scale 
private schools, but they approved these schools to a certain extent, considering them 
useful as supplementary educational facilities at a time when there were not yet enough 
regular public schools. The comment that, “Those small schools should be helped by 
treating them delicately and guiding them in a good direction” (Provincial police chief, 
52–53), and other similar remarks suggest that the kempei police tried to lead the sŏdang 
toward accommodation with colonial rule. That viewpoint reflected fairly faithfully the 
Government General’s policy, held until the “sŏdang regulations” were established, 
of “letting the sŏdang remain.”51 In another area, under orders from the director of the 
interior affairs bureau, the kempei police helped out with Japanese language teaching in 
places where no instructors had been sent from Japan.52 As far as we can see from the 
Summary, this kind of activity consisted mostly of stopping by regular public schools 
already equipped with Japanese language education facilities, guidance, and teachers. 
Kempei police who themselves personally taught Japanese language were found only in 
a few stations (Yŏngwŏl kempei detachment head, 95).
The Summary shows a side to the kempei police stance toward Christianity and the 
various educational institutions that should not necessarily be described as repressive. To 
accept a one-dimensional image of the kempei police as nothing but an “instrument of 
naked violence,” as is frequently done, might not fully account for everything the kempei 
police did in their work. Should we not take the view that the way they carried out their 
jobs was based on reasoned and careful policy considerations and calculations that went 
beyond what so many see as nothing but brutality? The kempei police were not simply a 
device for violence used to enforce policy; it seems fairer to say that they functioned as a 
policy implementation agency at the lowest levels, with violence accompanying some of 
their implementation methods.
Not all kempei police work involved the surveillance and so forth described above, 
which was higher police type of work. Kempei also assisted local government agencies 
in a role described as “administrative facilitation,” and they actively participated in 
managing the daily lives of Koreans. Of the numerous jobs of this kind that appear in 
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Figure 10, let us look first at how they assisted in road work, as an example. 
A statute relating to roads (Government General Order No. 51) was enacted in April 
1911, and the first phase of a road construction project was launched in August that year. 
Roads needed for army transport always took precedence in building and repair projects, 
and the kempei police had a large hand in planning routes and road layouts. According 
to “Regulations for Road Maintenance and Repair” (December 1912, Government 
General Order No. 25), road work was to be done by conscript labor, naturally without 
compensation, and it was mainly the job of the kempei police to make the conscripts keep 
working.53 This was the era of “Taishō democracy” in Japan, and two opinion leaders in 
particular, Nakano Seigō and Yoshino Sakuzō, had published articles highly critical of 
the way Japan was governing Korea. Because of those articles the strong power that the 
kempei police wielded in road projects and the grueling labor performed by conscripts 
were by then well known.54 One account in the Summary talks about the conditions of 
road building, and how difficult it was to carry out large-scale construction projects, 
like those that used dynamite, with forced labor (Inje kempei detachment head, 11–12). 
Others describe how deeply the Korean people resented the system: “They bitterly hate 
going out as forced labor” (Wŏnju kempei detachment head, 80). 
Cholwoo Lee considers the measures and rules used routinely to run the colony, 
drawing on Michel Foucault’s notion of “discipline” and locates the problem in “modernity 
as a problem of power and domination,” arguing that, “Japanese rule (re)discovered and 
(re)created as targets of control various fields of social practice uncontrolled before.”55 It 
seems, then, that even in the administrative work of the police in the early phase of the 
colony, where new institutions and a new order were introduced, new kinds of problems 
also emerged. 
How new problems arose in connection with the introduction of new institutions 
is illustrated by the program to improve public sanitation and public health in the early 
years of the colony. At that time there were not enough hospitals and doctors trained 
and equipped to administer Western medical treatment, and so the Government General 
approved employing on a temporary basis—as “interns”—practitioners of the traditional 
Chinese medicine used in Korea. The government depended heavily on the police for 
household surveys and epidemic prevention programs and on local administrative 
agencies for the program to teach the local population about sanitation. In Japan, the 
Police Bureau and the Public Health Bureau were separate agencies under the Home 
Ministry, and organizationally sanitation and public health were separate from the police. 
In Korea, however, public health and sanitation were put into the police orbit. Korea’s 
Bureau of Interior Affairs abolished the Sanitation section in April 1911, and its work 
was moved into the sanitation division within the Central Police Headquarters’ Police 
Affairs section. In April 1912, inspection and quarantine at seaports, which had been 
the responsibility of customs officials, and inspection of cows being sent out of Korea, 
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formerly done by officers in the Korean Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public 
Works, were shifted into the Central Police Headquarters. These arrangements put the 
police in charge of all functions related to public health and sanitation.56
The Summary includes a great many entries relating to an effort to set up what were 
called sanitation unions. Supervised by the kempei police, sanitation unions were groups 
that collected a fixed regular fee from local residents, including Japanese, and took on 
the tasks of improving cleanliness inside and outside the home, of toilets and streets; they 
worked on contagious disease prevention, helped to enforce sanitation and public health 
regulations more widely, and other activities.57 Efforts were made in Kangwŏndo to set up 
sanitation unions in the local areas, and 22 unions had been formed by 1912. Forty-three 
unions were newly organized in 1913.58 In fact, however, progress was difficult and the 
program fell short of expectations. On the grounds that “the unions aren’t really in place 
yet,” kempei police proposed forming sanitation unions only in areas of high population 
density, and they also suggested making it a policy to give the district sanitation function 
to the “school unions” (gakkō kumiai; Incorporated associations established to handle the 
financing of elementary school education for Japanese living in Korea were expected, 
depending on the condition of the school’s neighborhood, to take care of sanitation as one 
item in the operation of the school). The provincial police chief, however, was unwilling 
to approve either proposal (interchange between the Inje kempei detachment head and 
the provincial police chief, 7–9; interchange between the Kangnǔng police station head 
and the police chief, 37–38). In those places that did not yet have the necessary social and 
economic foundation for something like the sanitation unions, physicians hired by the 
police on a temporary basis and attached to the Korea kempeitai59 made rounds and treated 
people in their homes, or moved around the district and examined Koreans at places 
along the route. They also gave short training courses in sanitation to the policemen in 
those places (Yangyang police station chief, 24; Hoeyang kempei detachment chief, 65).
Problems were also caused when modern management methods were brought into the 
realms of land, woodland, and forests. About 80 percent of Kangwŏndo was mountainous 
or hilly, and therefore forestry-related administrative work was very important. With the 
enforcement of the Forest Law in 1908 and a cadastral survey that was begun in 1911 
requiring, among other things, certification of ownership rights to land, communal lands, 
whether forest or pasture, became national land (for the purpose of modern management). 
The rural population was barred from using it. This created ongoing friction with local 
people.60 
“Rumors arose that everything, even privately owned fields and hills would be 
confiscated,” and, “People were asking how they could make charcoal now. A lot of them 
had gotten together and a mood of insurgency was taking hold” (Uljin kempei detachment 
head, 97, 106). Thus troubles emerged that were seen as possible threats to peace and 
order. The provincial police chief recognized that, “If we are too rigid and too thorough 
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in enforcing the law, the people … are going to suffer financially” (103), and he advised 
flexibility in responding to such situations. Korean discontent in the province remained 
strong, however. The following year, in September 1914, several hundred people living 
in Samchŏk county staged a protest against the government confiscation of privately 
owned woodlands and a temporary Japanese employee in the Agriculture, Commerce and 
Industry Bureau was murdered.61 
Another issue concerned hwajŏn slash-and-burn agriculture. In Kangwŏndo this 
method of cultivation was fairly common. Farmers burned off the vegetation in a hillside 
or woodland plot before cultivating it and then moved on to another place in a few years 
when the fertility had declined. The government tried to ban this traditional method, but 
here, too, the provincial police chief thought it best to be flexible: “The sudden prohibition 
of this practice is making life very hard for the farmers in this province.” What the police 
should do, he said, is “consider local conditions, and depending on those” decide whether 
to allow people to continue the practice or to discipline them as violators of the law 
(Provincial police chief, 119. In that connection, Article 18 of the Forest Law of 1911 put 
police officers in charge of issuing permits to carry on slash-and-burn cultivation).
The situations described here give some idea of the involvement of the kempei 
police as administrators. One important role was their function as agents bringing 
modern management practices into areas that until then had remained largely outside the 
reach of national government regulation. As a consequence of that role, they could not 
avoid coming up against the contradiction created by the gap between the laws and the 
realities of life in the provinces. Given such circumstances, there were many cases when 
the resolution or handling of a problem was left to the discretion of the kempei police 
stationed in the local area. Their job was complicated by another factor, which, as the 
Summary reports, was the fact that “69 percent of the people have no education,” and so 
of course they had difficulty grasping what the laws and regulations meant (Provincial 
police chief, 75–76). One exchange expresses frustration that no matter how many times 
they arrested a fellow for gambling, it had no effect (Kimsŏng police station head response 
to a question from the provincial police chief, 55–56). These voices from the Summary 
communicate something of the difficulty that the kempei police experienced as they tried 
to modernize management in Kangwŏndo.
However, during the last half of the period of “military rule,” with the reorganization 
of rural administration62 and the jolting impact of the new, radical ideas around the time of 
World War I, the government tended, rather, to favor cutting back the role of the kempei 
police in general administration. In September 1915, Governor General Terauchi brought 
this matter up in a talk with the kempeitai commanders and police leaders:
Recently we have achieved a certain level in the gradual reorganization of the rural 
administrative structure, and as rural development proceeds, the main business of 
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the police has expanded tremendously. From now on I would prefer to see some 
reduction of the involvement of the police organization and have it function less 
as the support of government administration and devote more energy to its own 
work.63 
This move to separate the police from administrative duties became increasingly 
more as the police turned increasingly more attention to dealing with anti-Japanese 
movements after the Samil Uprising.
One final point is a phenomenon directly related to the very diversity of kempei 
police work and to their tendency to rely more and more frequently on their own judgment 
in dealing with the affairs of their districts. I am talking here about the routinization of 
dishonesty and improper behavior on the part of the lowest ranks of kempei police, who 
were mainly Koreans. In the kempei-dominated police organization, the lower the rank, the 
more Koreans were likely to be deployed in those posts. The posts of assistant patrolman 
and kempei auxiliaries came to be staffed only by Koreans, putting those low-level officers 
in frequent contact with the local population.64 In one respect, as was described in Section 
1 of this chapter, the 1911 implementation of decentralized deployment had the effect of 
loosening supervision over the lower-level officers, eventually giving them the leeway 
to be derelict in their work, to extort bribes from the local populace, and so on. Chōsen 
chūsatsu kempeitai shiryō contains records of enquiries put to lower-level kempei police 
and the responses, and these show how serious the problem had become. According to 
those records, measures to deal with these derelict or corrupt low-ranking Korean kempei 
auxiliaries and assistant patrolmen included admonishing them, having their families 
and contacts watched, or in the most flagrant cases, arranging to have those on special 
duty even tailed by another secret agent.65 The Summary also relates such goings-on. A 
comment concerning the use of lower ranking officers in civil suit mediation argues, “It 
is damaging to let lower-ranking officers do this because they are not fair” (Provincial 
police chief to Inje kempei detachment head, 11). In another case, kempei auxiliaries and 
assistant patrolmen “imitate” the standards of living of Japanese patrolmen, and because 
that left them short of cash, “there’s nothing they can do but swindle and do other bad 
things” (Provincial police chief to Jeongseon kempei outstation head, 36). Such execrable 
behavior by low-ranking Koreans in the kempei police was one factor stoking the intense 
anger that provoked the March 1st Movement. (More on this subject will be discussed in 
Section 2 of Chapter Five.)
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Chapter Review
This chapter reexamined the kempei police in its institutional aspects, focusing on the core 
of the institution, which was the limited number of kempei assigned to civil police posts, 
on the one hand, and the much larger number doing routine civil police work, on the other. 
Previous studies discuss kempei being assigned to police posts and kempei performing 
actual civil police work without distinguishing between them, but it is clear that the two 
were determined by separate sets of laws and regulations, and that the laws embodied 
different aims. Provisions in the 1910 Imperial Ordinances Nos. 296 and 302 (and their 
revisions) stipulated the placement of kempei in civil police posts. In the kempei police 
organization, which was centered on higher police work, those assignments were limited 
to high-ranking kempei officers who were supposed to command civil police officers. 
Having kempei do the ordinary jobs of civil policemen, however, was authorized by the 
1910 Imperial Ordinance No. 343. We saw that the numbers of kempei doing civil police 
work soared in late 1910–1911, from about one- quarter of the total to almost 100 percent. 
We can deduce that such a rapid increase was a consequence of an operation to use 
kempei in civil police work in a more comprehensive way, at a time when decentralized 
deployment enabled a denser network of facilities. Another reason to have larger numbers 
of kempei take on civil police jobs was to carry out in an organized way the plethora of 
laws, rules, and regulations governing many aspects of everyday life. 
Second, we explored the way the Government General’s perception of the security 
and order situation shifted over the decade of the 1910s. Before annexation, priority in 
maintaining security and stability went to the task of putting down the armed resistance 
by Koreans in the Righteous Armies, but soon after the annexation the insurrections 
had faded and ceased to be the major concern. Around the time of the Case of the 105, 
however, Governor General Terauchi had become anxiously aware of the movement 
outside Korea to build a base for the independence movement, and he knew of the 
simmering ambitions by Christians and other nationalist Koreans to “take back the 
country.” Further, he remained concerned about disturbing ideas even after one of the 
strongest secret societies in Korea had been effectively dismantled with the arrests of the 
105. Terauchi had become exceedingly pessimistic about Korea’s future, which was one 
reason he resigned as minister of war. With the outbreak of World War I, his outlook on 
peace and order in Korea changed yet once more, growing darker. 
The Government General appreciated how quickly economic conditions in Korea 
were improving, partly because of the war boom, but magnetic new ideas pounding on 
Korean society simply reconfirmed its belief in the need for extreme vigilance. Toward 
the end of the war, a sense of danger gripped the kempei police as they considered the 
kinds of threats posed by influences from the Russian Revolution and the powerful notion 
of national self-determination that was sweeping the world. But until the Samil Uprising 
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erupted, they could not get past the sense that to maintain strength at the current level, or 
lower, was enough to maintain peace and security. 
Third, in the first two sections we considered how characteristic features of the 
kempei police—their priority on higher police work and the way they intervened in the 
daily life of the Korean population—played out in their routine jobs in their districts. 
We saw, in the case of Kangwŏndo, how the kempei police carried out the higher police 
functions of surveillance and surveys of religions, particularly Christianity, and of private 
schools, village schools, and other Korean educational facilities. Emphasis was put on 
careful monitoring and “guiding” schools in the right direction. I argue that the kempei 
police did not always resort to violent means and in fact wove carefully thought-out 
policy considerations into the means they used. We also looked at some of the variety of 
managerial jobs they did, such as their roles in road work, public sanitation programs, 
and modern management of forest lands. The final points focused on how the kempei 
police functioned as the agent of change, introducing and teaching modern methods of 
management in an area that was largely untouched by national power in premodern times, 
and on the structure of a situation where low-ranking kempei police, faced with the gap 
between the law and the reality, increasingly made their own judgments in an expanding 
sphere of activities. 
It would have been valuable to discuss the topics of Section 3 in relation to the 
changes in the perception of security that was the focus of Section 2, but since my 
materials dealt with only certain times and places, it was impossible to compare them 
adequately. I did not develop the topic of Korean reactions to the way the kempei police 
did their work, but I will go a little further into these question in the next chapter, using 
the findings of surveys of popular sentiment. 
1 A fair number of books and articles state that the Korea kempeitai was under the command of the 
Korea Garrison Army (in 1918 the name was changed to the Korea Army [Chōsengun]), for ex-
ample, or they talk about the “Korea [Garrison] Army Kempei.” Such references are inaccurate.
2 Chōsen kempei rekishi, vol. 2, p. 195.
3 Yi Sŏn-gun, “Ilche Ch’ongdokpu ǔi hŏnbyŏng chŏngchi wa sasang t’anap” [Suppression of 
Thought and Kempei Politics under the Japanese Government General], Han’guk sasan [Korean 
Thought], vol. 8, June 1966; Kang Dŏk-sang, “Kempei-seiji ka no Chŏsen” [Korea under Kempei 
Rule], Rekishigaku kenkyū, no. 321, February 1967; Yi Hyŏn-hǔi, “Sam-il undong ijŏn hŏnbyŏng 
kyŏnch’alche ǔi sŏnggyŏk” [The Character of the Kempei-dominated Police System before the 
March 1st Movement] in Sam-il undong 50 ju’nyŏn kinyŏm nonjip [Essays Commemorating the 
50th Anniversary of the March 1st Movement], Tonga Ilbosa, 1969; Kim Yong-dŏk, “Sam-il un-
dong ijŏn ǔi t’aehyŏng” [Punishment by Flogging before the March 1st Movement] in ibid.; Yi 
Yŏn-bok, “Ilche ǔi hŏnbyŏng kyŏngch’al sogo” [Thoughts on Imperial Japan’s Kempei-dominated 
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Police], in Kasŏng Yi Sŏn-gun Paksa Kohǔi Kinyŏm Nonmunjip Kanhaeng Wiwŏnhoe, ed., Yi 
Sŏn-gun paksa kohǔi kinyŏm nonmunjip [Essays on Korean Studies in Commemoration of the 70th 
Birthday of Doctor Yi Sŏn-gun], Ǔlyu Munhwasa, 1974; Son Jŏng-mok, “Ilche ch’imnyak ch’ogi 
Ch’ongdok t’onch’i ch’eje wa hŏnbyŏng kyŏnch’al chedo”[The Kempei-dominated Police System 
in the Government General System of Rule during the Early Phase of the Japanese Aggression], 
Seoul Sirip Taehak Sudokwŏn Kaebal Yŏn’guso yŏn’gu nonjip [Seoul Metropolitan University In-
stitute of Metropolitan Area Development Papers], vol. 11, December 1983; Sin Chu-baek, “1910 
nyŏndae Ilche ǔi Chosŏn t’ongch’i wa Chosŏn chudun Ilbon’gun―Chosŏn’gun kwa hŏnbyŏng 
kyŏnch’al chedo rǔl chunsim ǔro” [Research on the Japanese Army Stationed in Korea—the ‘Ko-
rea Army’—and the Kempei-dominated Police System in Korea under Japanese Rule during the 
1910s], Han’guksa yŏn’gu, no. 109, June 2000.
4 Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Chosen tōchishi ronkō, p. 92.
5  Pak Ŭn-gyŏng, Ilche-ha Chosŏnin kwallyo yŏn’gu [Studies on Korean Bureaucrats under Imperial 
Japan], Hangminsa, 1999, p. 58.
6 Chang Sin, “Kyŏnch’al chedo ǔi hwangnip kwa singminji kukka kwŏllyŏk ǔi ilsan ch’imt’u” [Es-
tablishment of the Police System and the Penetration of Colonial State Power into Daily Life], in 
Yŏnse Taehakkyo Kukhak Yŏn’guwŏn, ed., Ilche ǔi singmin chibae wa ilsang saenghwal [Every-
day Life under Japanese Colonial Rule], Hean, 2004, pp. 561–562.
7 Some scholars propose that kempei superior privates were assigned as (civil police) patrolmen (for 
example, Namiki Masahito, “Minzoku undō, keisatsu” (1), p. 74), but there were no laws providing 
for such assignments and that understanding is inaccurate. 
8 Refers here and below to Tsushima Ikunoshin, “Chōsen ni okeru kempei keisatsu tōitsu seido no 
kōsatsu” [A Study on the Joint Kempei Police System in Korea] (1), Hōgaku ronsō, vol. 49, no. 4, 
October 1943, p. 510; Ibid., (2), Hōgaku ronsō, vol. 49, no. 6, December 1943, p. 722.
9 In this connection, when the kempei police system was still fairly new, Tsushima noted rumors 
circulating among civil policemen that “henceforth, if there are openings in posts of police super-
intendent or police inspector, no one will be hired to fill them,” and that, “Instead, kempei will be 
appointed to fill those vacant positions.” Thus, the civil police seem to have expected kempei power 
to expand throughout the whole police system as civil police posts continued to be filled by kempei 
appointees. The rumors turned out to be groundless (actually, after March 1911 and June 1912, re-
spectively, civil police were recruited for the posts of superintendent and inspector), but they make 
it clear that the civil police understood perfectly well in that early phase that the kempeitai intended 
to take over the power to command the civil police by putting kempei into certain civil police posts.
10 See Tsushima (2), pp. 724–725.
11 Strictly speaking, only the 1910 and 1911 volumes of Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō [Annual Sta-
tistical Report of the Government General of Korea] contain “kempei detachments and kempei 
officers who handle the work of police stations” or similar expressions. From 1912 onward the 
Annual Statistical Report refers to the “kempeitai and its staff.” Despite the change in the wording 
of the reference, however, the numbers that appear in the report in 1912 onward continue to be pre-
sented using the same statistical categories as appear in the 1910 and 1911 volumes. Moreover, in 
the 1915–1917 volumes of Keisatsu tōkei [Police Statistics] (edited and published by Korea Kem-
peitai Headquarters and the Korea Government General Central Police Headquarters, reprinted by 
Kyŏngin Munhwasa, 1989) the figures presented as numbers of “kempei staff currently serving in 
civil police positions” are almost identical to those for “kempeitai and its staff.” For those reasons 
it seemed safe to conclude that the figures in the Government General’s Annual Statistical Report 
indicated numbers of kempei staff who were doing ordinary police jobs.
12 Before drawing this conclusion from the table, however, we must take into consideration the dif-
ference in numerical values that emerges between the rate (frequency) of kempei appointment 
to police posts in Figure 8 and the rate in Figure 9. In Figure 9 the numbers for each category of 
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commissioned officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers are greater than in Figure 
8. This is partly because the two tables were constructed from different sources. For example, the 
Personnel Directory used for Figure 5 does not include commissioned- or noncommissioned-level 
officers who worked in the accounting, sanitation/public health, or veterinarian sections of the 
Korea kempeitai, while the Ministry of War Annual Statistical Report used for Figure 9 does. If we 
focus only on the idiosyncrasies of the particular sources used to derive the figures, however, we 
cannot explain huge differences in numbers—for example between 476 noncommissioned officers 
in Figure 8 and 812 in Figure 9. I still have not found a logical way to resolve this problem. Also, 
among the police posts assigned to kempei commissioned and warrant officers, some of them, 
such as police affairs officers (keimukan), were probably not included in the statistical category of 
“police officers who perform ordinary police business,” because police affairs officers were purely 
administrative with no executive police powers. Admittedly, therefore, it is problematic to use these 
statistical data in a way that compares and contrasts them. Nonetheless, given the current lack of 
any other such statistical data, I have gone ahead and used these with the expectation of finding 
some consistent patterns in them. 
13 For example, Kang Man-gil, Han’guk hyŏndaesa [A Modern History of Korea], Japanese translation 
published by Koma Shorin, 1985, p. 25; Han’guk Minjungsa Yŏn’guhoe, ed., Han’guk minjungsa 
kǔndaep’yŏn [A History of the Korean People: Modern Times], Japanese translation published by 
Mokuseisha, 1989, p. 151; Kasuya, op. cit., p. 125.
14 Nakatsuka Akira, “Chōsen minzoku undō to Nihon no Chōsen shihai” [The Korean Nationalist 
Movement and Japanese Rule in Korea], first printing 1969, Shisō, no. 537, March 1969; reprinted 
in Kindai Nihon no Chōsen ninshiki [Modern Japanese Perceptions of Korea], Kenbun Shuppan, 
1993, p. 100; Yi Yŏn-bok, “Ilche ǔi hŏnbyŏng,” p. 182.
15 “Rikugun daijin seigi: Kankoku chǔsatsu kempeitai o zōka su” [Request from War Minister: That 
the Korea Kempeitai Be Increased], June 1910, in Kōbun ruijū, 2A, Category 11, 1106.
16 Chōsen kempeitai rekishi, vol. 2, pp. 230–231.
17 Government General of Korea, Chōsen Sōtokufu shisei nenpō [Government General of Korea An-
nual Report on Administration], 1911 edition, 1913, pp. 69–70.
18 Korea Government General Central Police Headquarters, ed., Chōsen keisatsu ippan [Outline of the 
Korean Police], 1912, p. 23.
19 See Matsuda, “Nihon tōchika no Chōsen,” pp. 46–47.
20 Yi Chong-min, “Keihanzai no torishimari hōrei ni miru minshū tōsei―Chosen no baai o chūshin 
ni” [Approaches to Social Control Seen in Laws on Punishments for Minor Offenses: The Case of 
Korea], in Asano and Matsuda, eds., Teikoku Nihon no hōteki kōzō, pp. 346–348.
21 Terauchi to Yamagata, 10 September 1910, in Yamagata Aritomo kankei monjo, vol. 20, held in the 
National Diet Library Kensei Shiryōshitsu (Modern Japanese Political History Collection).
22 Ōkubo Haruno to Terauchi, 14 November 1910, in Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 222:19. 
23 Komori, Akashi Motojirō, p. 452.
24 Terauchi to Yamagata, 6 May, 1911, in Yamagata Aritomo kankei monjo, vol. 21.
25 Hara Keiichirō, ed., Hara Takashi nikki [Diary of Hara Takashi] vol. 3, Fukumura Shuppan, 1965, 
pp. 134, 158, 264, 6 June 1911; 28 August 1911; 23 November 1912. Terauchi to Katsura, 29 Au-
gust 1911 in Katsura Tarō kankei monjo, 62:26. Concerning Katsura’s intentions, also see Kobayas-
hi Michihiko, Nihon no tairiku seisaku 1895–1914 [Japan’s Continental Asia Policy 1895–1914], 
Nansōsha, 1996, p. 290.
26 Terauchi to Katsura, 23 May 1912. Katsura Tarō kankei monjo, 62:36.
27 For the history of research on both incidents, see Yun Kyŏng-no, 105-in sakkŏn kwa Sinminhoe 
yŏn’gu [The Case of the 105 and the Shinminhoe (New People’s Association)], Iljisa, 1990, p. 9 ff.
28 Terauchi to Yamagata, ca. June 1912, in Yamagata Aritomo kankei monjo, vol. 23.
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29 Terauchi to Tokutomi Sohō, 12 June 1912. Sakata Masatoshi et al., eds., Tokutomi Sohō kankei 
monjo, vol. 2, Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1985, p. 269.
30 Kunitomo Naokane, “Hi: Futei jiken ni yotte mitaru Chōsenjin” [Confidential: Koreans as Ob-
served in Connection with the Disturbances], unpublished material, 1911; reprinted Fuji Shuppan, 
1986, pp. 414, 429.
31 Ishizuka to Terauchi, 18 November 1911. Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 86:6. See also 
Matsuda, “Ilbon yukgun,” p. 241. 
32 Yim Kyŏng-sŏk, “1910 nyŏndae kegǔp kusŏng kwa nodongja/nonmin undong” [Class Structure in 
the 1910s and the Labor-Peasant Movement], in Han’guk Yŏksa Yŏn’guso, Yŏksa Munje Yŏn’guso, 
eds., Han’guk kǔndae sasansa yŏn’gu [Studies on the History of Modern Political Thought in Ko-
rea], Ch’ŏngnyŏnsa, 1989; Pak Ch’an-sǔng, Han’guk kǔndae chŏnch’i sasansa yŏn’gu [ Studies 
on the History of Modern Political Ideas in Korea], Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 1992, Chapter. 2; Chŏng 
T’ae-hun, “1920 nyŏndae chŏnban-gi Ilche ǔi ‘Munhwa chŏngch’i’ wa burǔjoa chŏngch’i seryŏk 
ǔi taeǔng” [Imperial Japan’s ‘Cultural Rule’ in the First Half of the 1920s and Responses from the 
Bourgeois Political Forces], Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil, no. 47, March 2003, pp. 25–27.
33 Chōsen Sōtokufu kanpō, 24 August 1914.
34 Mizuno Naoki, ed., Chōsen Sōtoku yukoku kunji shūsei [A Collection of Speeches and Addresses 
by the Governor General], vol. 1, Ryokuin Shobō, 2001, p. 374.
35 Mizuno, Chōsen Sōtoku yukoku kunji shūsei, p. 419.
36 Yano Sukezō, “Chōsen ni okeru kempei to sono kaizen ni tsuite” [The Kempei in Korea and Their 
Improvement], Gunji keisatsu zasshi, vol. 11, no. 7, July 1917, pp. 19–20.
37 Attached to the Ŭiju kempeitai station of the P’yŏngan-bukto provincial police department. This 
report, written around September 1917, is included in Chōsen kempeitai shiryō.
38 According to Yuge Kōtarō, director of educational affairs, whose informal observations were print-
ed in Maeil sinbo (16 January 1919), each region varied but in general, “There has been a remark-
able increase in the number of student who voluntarily are going” to the regular public schools. He 
also talked about the plan to step up the pace of increasing the number of regular schools. Also see 
Furukawa Noriko, “Chōsen ni okeru futsū gakkō no teichaku katei: 1910 nendai o chūshin ni” [The 
Process of Establishing Regular Public Schools in Korea: Focusing on the 1910s], Nihon no kyōiku 
shigaku, vol. 38, October 1995.
39 Yun Pyŏng-sŏk, “Sam-il undong e taehan Ilbon chŏngbu ǔi chŏngch’aek” [Japanese Government 
Policy to Deal with the March 1st Movement” in Sam-il undong 50 ju’nyŏn kinyŏm nonjip, p. 416.
40 “Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimu Sōkanbu naikun no ken” [Internal Addresses Given at the Government 
General Central Police Headquarters], Mitsu dai nikki, 1919, 1.
41 Furumi Izushio to Terauchi Masatake, 24 March 1917. Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 57:1.
42 As for changes in police-related expenses (kempei expenses in Japan’s general account and kempei 
auxiliaries plus police affairs expenses in the Korea Government General special account), see 
Matsuda, “Nihon tōchika no Chōsen,” Table 1, p. 36. The increase in police-related expenses from 
1918 onward was applied primarily to salary increases for lower-level staff, including patrolmen 
and kempei auxiliaries (Maeil sinbo, 29 December 1918). 
43 Lacking documentation to verify the complete schedule of the provincial police heads conference 
of 1913, the year the Summary was produced, I used instead the schedules of the provincial police 
heads conference and the kempei heads conference held in May 1914, which were published in the 
Maeil sinbo 28 April–3 May 1914.
44 Those are 1914 cases from and the Ch’unch’ŏn kempeitai, Kangwŏndo Police Department. Kem-
pei buntaichō kaigi shorui [Documents from the Conference of Kempei Detachment Heads], June 
1914, in Chōsen chusatsu kempeitai shiryō.
45 “Envelope pages” formed by printing on one side, folding in half with printed side out, and binding 
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at the open edge side; each folded sheet was numbered once. 
46 For instance, in 1915 a total of 23 searches were made in all of Korea and 108 officers were 
deployed for that purpose; of those, Kangwŏndo accounted for 16 searches and 74 officers to car-
ry them out. For a comprehensive treatment of the anti-Japanese Righteous Army movement, in 
Kangwŏndo see Yi Ku-yong, “Kangwŏndo chibang ǔi ǔibyŏng hangjŏn” [Righteous Armies’ Re-
sistance in Kangwŏndo] in Kangwŏn ǔibyŏng undongsa [History of Righteous Army Campaign in 
Kangwŏn], Kangwŏn Taehakkyo Ch’ulpanbu, 1987.
47 Kangwŏn Provincial Police Department, Keimukikan kaigi shimon jikō tōshin (Keimukakari) [En-
quiries and Responses at the Police Organization Conference (run by the Police Affairs Section)], 
June 1914. In Chōsen chūsatsu kempeitai shiryō, 25–33; Ch’unch’ŏn Kempeitai Headquarters, 
Kangwŏndo jokyo kogai [Summary of Conditions in Kangwŏndo],1913, included in Sakurai Yoshi-
yuki Bunko [Sakurai Yoshiyuki Library] held by Tokyo Keizai University, pp. 243–244.
48 In 1915, there was only one actual clash between the kempei police and Righteous Army militia in 
Kangwŏndo (involving four Righteous Army fighters).
49 Cho Tong-gŏl, “Sam-il undong ǔi chibangsa jok sŏnggyŏk: Kangwŏndo chibang ǔr chungsim ǔro” 
[The Local Character of the March 1st Movement: Kangwŏndo” in Ilche-ha singminji sidae ǔi min-
jok undong [Nationalist Movements in the Colonial Period under Japanese Rule], Tosŏ Ch’ulpan 
Pulpit, 1981, pp. 37–41.
50 On the protest to Terauchi and Akashi from the foreign missionaries living in Korea, see Yun 
Kyŏng-no, 105 in sakkŏn, pp. 150–152. Also, a protest from the Presbyterian Church from the city 
of Taegu was discussed at the conference of provincial police chiefs in 1913; they said, in part, “We 
hope the police will not enter the houses of missionaries and Christians without permission” (Memo 
written in 1913 by Terauchi, in Yamamoto, ed., Terauchi Masatake nikki, p. 601).
51 No Yŏng-t’aek, Ilche-ha minjung kyoyuk undongsa [History of the People’s Movement for Educa-
tion under Japanese Rule], T’amgudang, 1979, pp. 81–83; Furukawa Noriko, “1910 nendai Chōsen 
ni okeru shodō” [Traditional Village Sŏdang Schools in Korea during the 1910s], Ajia kyōikushi 
kenkyū, no. 6, March 1997, pp. 43–46.
52 Police Notice No. 8400: Notification from kempeitai commander-in-chief and police affairs section 
chief to provincial kempeitai unit heads and provincial police department heads, “Concerning Re-
quest that Kempei Patrolmen Provide Japanese Language Education,” Keimu geppō, no. 7, January 
1911, pp. 122–124.
53 On the Government General’s road building plan and the general situation of the burden placed on 
the Korean people, Hirose Teizō, “1910 nendai no dōro kensetsu to Chōsen shakai” [Road Con-
struction in the 1910s and Korean Society] (Chōsen gakuhō, no. 164, July 1997) gives a detailed 
account.
54 Nakano Seigō, Waga mitaru Man-Sen [Manchuria and Korea as I See Them], Seikyōsha, 1915, pp. 
52–53; Yoshino Sakuzō, “ManKan o shisatsu shite” [Observing Manchuria and Korea] (1916), in 
Matsuo Takayoshi, ed., Yoshino Sakuzō, Chūgoku Chōsen ron [China and Korea], Heibonsha, 1970, 
pp. 56–57.
55 Chowloo Lee, “Modernity, Legality, and Power in Korea under Japanese Rule,” in Gi-wook 
Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea, Cambridge, Mass., and London: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 1999, p. 50. With the colonization of Korea, government authori-
ties began interfering with the smallest details of everyday lives, something that had not previously 
been targets of their management and control. It has been argued that this development in the use 
of power signaled the emergence of “modernity” in Japanese rule. Two such works are Yi Chong-
min, “1910 nyŏndae Kyŏngsŏng jumin dǔl ǔi ‘choe’ wa ‘pŏl’” [The ‘Crimes’ and ‘Punishments’ 
of Residents in Seoul in the 1910s], Seoul hak yŏn’gu, no. 17, September 2001; and Chang Sin, 
“Kyŏnch’al chedo ǔi hwangnip”. 
56 Matsumoto Takenori, “Shokuminchi ki Chōsen nōson ni okeru eisei, iryō jigyō no tenkai: ‘Sho-
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kuminchi-teki kindaisei’ ni kansuru shiron” [Projects for Sanitation and Medicine in Agricultural 
Villages in Colonial Korea: An Essay on ‘Colonial Modernity’], Shōkei ronsō, vol. 34, no. 4, March 
1999; Pak Yun-chae, Han’guk kǔndae ǔihak ǔi kiwŏn [The Origins of Modern Medicine in Korea], 
Hean, 2005, pp. 302–322, 330–336.
57 I could not find sanitation union agreements for Kangwŏndo, and so I used for reference the “Sec-
ond sanitation union agreement for Namsan-myŏn (Namsan township) in Hamgyŏng-bukto,” (ca. 
1915, found in Sankō shorui-tsuzuri [Reference Materials] (This source, Sankō shorui-tsuzuri, is a 
collection of materials relating to work duties and performance; it is presumed to have belonged to 
Fujita Shigekazu, a kempei superior private, who worked at that time in one of the dispatch stations 
that were under the command of the Hoeryong kempei detachment of the Kyŏngsŏng kempeitai in 
Hamgyŏng-bukto. It is the property of Tsujita Fumio). According to this union agreement, one of 
the union’s functions is to do “anything that will assist the police in doing their job as requested by 
the kempei.” The agreement also stipulates that the union must receive approval from the respon-
sible kempei detachment head in matters of budget, settlement of accounts, and items that require 
decision-making. The agreement provides a glimpse into how the kempei police actually controlled 
the management of the sanitation union.
58 “Survey of Sanitation Unions” (as of the end of 1913), one of the “Reference Tables” compiled 
by the Ch’unch’ŏn Kempeitai and Kangwŏndo Police Department. Included in Chōsen chūsatsu 
kempeitai shiryō.
59 As of the end of 1913, 5–11 police doctors were assigned to every police station in Seoul and each 
provincial police department. Out of a total of 105 doctors who were sent all over Korea, 7 went to 
the Kangwŏndo provincial police department.
60 Yun Hae-dong, “Chosŏn esŏ ǔi Sam-il undong kwa irǔnba [Munhwa chŏngch’i] ro ǔi chŏnhwan” 
[The March 1st Movement in Korea and the Resulting Switch to “Cultural Rule], paper presented 
at a symposium in October 2002 entitled “The Life and Times of Saitō Makoto.” In that paper Yun 
takes up the issue of prohibiting entry into the former communal forests, and argues that by disturb-
ing the traditional order in Korea’s agrarian society, that prohibition could have been a factor in the 
March 1st movement.
61 Maeil sinbo, 5 April 1915. Kim Chŏng-gyŏng, Samch’ŏk hyangt’osa [History of My Home, Sam-
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